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FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW: A FAILED APPROACH TO
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR
REAL REFORM
by
*
Elizabeth M. McCormick
In July 2015, Kate Steinle, a 32-year-old San Francisco resident, was
shot and killed as she walked with her father along a popular fishing
pier. Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, a native of Mexico living
unlawfully in the United States, was arrested and later confessed to
shooting Ms. Steinle. Lopez-Sanchez had seven prior criminal
convictions and had previously been deported from the United States five
times. Three months before the shooting, Lopez-Sanchez was released from
custody by the San Francisco Sheriff’s office despite a request from federal
immigration officials that Lopez-Sanchez be detained for transfer to
federal custody and, eventually, removal from the United States.
In the aftermath of Steinle’s death, a torrent of accusations and blame
were leveled at the San Francisco Sheriff’s office for failing to comply with
the immigration detainer, at the City of San Francisco for establishing
itself as a sanctuary city where unauthorized immigrants are alleged to
be immune from prosecution of immigration law violations, and at the
Obama administration for failing to enforce federal laws designed to
shut down sanctuary cities. More specifically, it was argued that two
federal “anti-sanctuary” laws passed in 1996 made it illegal for San
Francisco to refuse to comply with federal immigration authorities’
requests for assistance and that the Obama administration had willfully
failed to enforce those laws against hundreds of sanctuary jurisdictions.
Had these laws been obeyed and enforced, critics asked, would Kate
Steinle be alive today?
This Article offers an answer to this question. It does so by closely
examining the history of the 1996 federal anti-sanctuary laws, the ways
in which state and federal courts have understood their meaning and
purpose, and the evolving role of the statutes in the national
*
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immigration debate, in particular the struggle to define the proper role for
state and local actors in immigration enforcement. The Article closes with
a discussion of the anti-sanctuary statutes in the context of Kate Steinle’s
killing and San Francisco’s sanctuary law, concluding that the San
Francisco ordinance which mandated Lopez-Sanchez’s release from
custody did not violate the anti-sanctuary statutes or any other federal
law. On the other hand, San Francisco’s sanctuary provision also did
not prohibit the San Francisco Sheriff from contacting federal
immigration officials to advise them that Lopez-Sanchez would be
released, something that did not happen and that may very well have
saved Kate Steinle’s life. Almost two decades of experience with the antisanctuary statutes and the recent senseless death of Kate Steinle reveal
that an anti-sanctuary approach to immigration enforcement is a failed
strategy that diverts resources from enforcement priorities like national
security and public safety and diverts attention from seeking real
solutions through comprehensive immigration reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2015, Kate Steinle, a 32-year-old San Francisco resident,
was shot and killed as she walked with her father along a popular fishing
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pier. Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, a native of Mexico living unlawfully
in the United States on and off since 1991, was arrested and later confessed to shooting Ms. Steinle. Sanchez had a number of prior criminal
convictions and had previously been deported from the United States
five times. Three months before the shooting, Sanchez was released from
custody by the San Francisco Sheriff’s office despite a request from federal immigration officials that Sanchez be detained for transfer to federal
3
custody and, eventually, removal from the United States. For more than
a year, a San Francisco ordinance had been in place which prohibited
city officials from keeping an individual in custody based on a civil immigration detainer like the one lodged by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) against Lopez-Sanchez, except where that person had a felony conviction within seven years and a judicial warrant had
4
been issued. Since no warrant was provided to the Sheriff for LopezSanchez, he was released from custody when his San Francisco criminal
5
case, a 20-year-old drug charge, was dismissed. In the aftermath of
Steinle’s death, accusations and blame have been leveled at the San
Francisco Sheriff’s office for failing to comply with the immigration detainer, at the City of San Francisco for establishing itself as a sanctuary
6
city where unauthorized immigrants are alleged to be immune from
prosecution of immigration law violations, and at the Obama administration for failing to enforce federal laws designed to shut down sanctuary
7
cities. More specifically, it has been argued that two federal laws passed

1

Lee Romney, Family of Woman Allegedly Slain by Deportee Files Claims Against S.F.
and U.S., L.A. Times (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnkate-steinle-claims-20150901-story.html; Lee Romney et al., Fatal Shooting of S.F.
Woman Reveals Disconnect Between ICE, Local Police; 5-time Deportee Charged, L.A. Times
(July 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-sf-shooting-20150707story.html.
2
Federal authorities gave his real name as Jose Inez Garcia-Zarate. Juan
Francisco Lopez-Sanchez is one of several pseudonyms he has used. Romney et al.,
supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12I (2015). The ordinance was an amendment to
the administrative code and was entitled “Due Process Ordinance for All on Civil
Immigration Detainers.”
5
See Romney et al., supra note 1.
6
See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12H (2015). San Francisco passed the City and
County of Refuge ordinance in 1989. The ordinance bars the use of city resources to
assist with immigration enforcement or immigration status checks. The ordinance
also prohibits local officials from detaining, arresting, or questioning an individual on
the basis of immigration status. Finally, the ordinance prohibits gathering or
disseminating information about individuals’ immigration status, except in the case
of individuals charged with or convicted of felonies.
7
Scott Eric Kaufman, Bill O’Reilly: The Murder of Kate Steinle Proves Donald Trump Is
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in 1996 made it illegal for San Francisco to refuse to comply with federal
immigration authorities’ requests for assistance and that the Obama administration had willfully failed to enforce those laws against hundreds of
sanctuary jurisdictions. Had these laws been obeyed and enforced, critics
argue, Kate Steinle would be alive today.
It seems beyond dispute that there was a significant failure in the
immigration-enforcement system that permitted the release of Francisco
Lopez-Sanchez, an unauthorized immigrant who had been deported at
least five times, had multiple felony drug convictions, and had served
lengthy prison terms for at least two convictions for illegal reentry after
8
removal. What is much less clear is whether two federal laws in place
since 1996, even with 100% compliance and enforcement, would have
blocked San Francisco from putting in place its 2013 civil-detainer ordinance or the city’s long-standing sanctuary ordinance, or prevented
Lopez-Sanchez’s release from custody three months before Kate Steinle’s
fatal shooting. Since Steinle’s killing, lawmakers and political commentators have debated whether San Francisco or any other state or municipality can lawfully refuse to cooperate in the enforcement of federal immi9
gration laws. In particular, they disagree about whether two federal
statutes enacted in 1996 require such cooperation in immigration enforcement, or merely encourage it. Although Kate Steinle’s death has
brought renewed attention to this issue, the question itself is anything
but new.
In 1996, Congress passed two laws that prohibit state or local governments from restricting communication with the federal government
regarding the immigration status of any individual. Section 434 of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
10
1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1644, and § 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
11
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. § 1373, were
passed within weeks of each other in an attempt to encourage and explicitly authorize state and local law enforcement agencies to communicate
Right About Mexicans, Salon (July 7, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/07/07/
bill_oreilly_the_murder_of_kate_steinle_proves_donald_trump_is_right_about_mexi
cans/ (reporting statement of commentator Bill O’Reilly that “the mayor and city
supervisors of San Francisco are directly responsible for the murder of Kate Steinle,
and the Obama administration is complicit”).
8
See Romney et al., supra note 1.
9
See, e.g., United States Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 9, 62–64 (2015) [hereinafter Homeland Security Hearing]
(statement of Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Security) (stating that mandating
state cooperation might violate the Constitution).
10
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012)).
11
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373(2012)).
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with federal immigration authorities regarding the status and presence of
unauthorized immigrants in their jurisdictions. In addition to encouraging cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts, these
provisions were also a response to certain noncooperation or sanctuary
policies and practices adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s by some state
and local governments and law enforcement agencies who objected to
federal immigration policies and priorities and to efforts to involve state
and local government actors in immigration policing. Notably, neither of
12
the 1996 federal anti-sanctuary statutes mandates cooperation or sharing of information with federal immigration authorities, but both prohibit any restriction on information sharing between the federal government
and state or local government entities or officials. In the almost two decades since they became law, the anti-sanctuary provisions have been at
the center of legal challenges brought by local governments preemptively
defending local sanctuary provisions and private citizens and organizations challenging local policies and practices alleged to violate these federal laws.
Just days after the laws went into effect in 1996, the City of New York
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the statutes and
defending a 1989 executive order that prohibited New York City officials
and employees from sharing information with federal immigration au13
thorities. In response, the United States defended the statutes by arguing that a local policy like New York’s, which barred voluntary cooperation with federal immigration authorities was incompatible with effective
implementation of federal immigration laws and policy and was therefore
12

Throughout this Article, I refer to 8 USC §§ 1644 and 1373 as “anti-sanctuary
statutes” or “anti-sanctuary provisions” as a shorthand reference only. Similarly, the
use of the term “sanctuary” is used here to refer in general to measures adopted by
localities that place limits of any kind on the assistance that the localities will provide
to federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration law.
There is no definition of “sanctuary” in federal law and there is a wide and diverse
range of activities that might qualify as a “sanctuary” measure under the definition I
use here. I acknowledge, as discussed further, that the use of the term sanctuary is
itself controversial in that it is often used pejoratively by those who oppose sub-federal
efforts by state and municipal governments to limit cooperation or assistance with
federal immigration authorities, and some jurisdictions that have been labeled with
the term reject it outright. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies:
Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. Irvine L.
Rev. 247, 253–54 (2012). See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language:
Immigration Metaphors and the Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 1545
(2011) (asserting that the current immigration linguistic metaphors are problematic
and suggesting that changes, such as using the word “migration” rather than
“immigration,” will help humanize the dialogue surrounding immigration and
immigration reform).
13
See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31–33 (2d Cir. 1999).

LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete)

170

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

5/24/2016 4:23 PM

[Vol. 20:1

preempted by the federal statutes at issue. The City’s challenge failed in
14
federal district court and on appeal. The statutes have also been the basis of unsuccessful challenges to local law enforcement policies that purport to restrict communication by police officers with federal immigration authorities about the immigration status of individuals the officers
15
encounter in the course of their duties. However, since 1996, the United States government has never sought to enforce these laws against a
state or local government, or to invalidate a sub-federal sanctuary law or
16
practice based on these provisions.
Indeed, rather than being used as a weapon against sub-federal restrictions on cooperation or communications with federal immigration
authorities, in recent years the anti-sanctuary provisions have been used
instead to both challenge and support state and local efforts to engage in
the enforcement of federal immigration laws. On the one hand, proponents of more robust state and local involvement in immigration regulation and enforcement have repeatedly argued that the anti-sanctuary
provisions are an expression of Congress’s clear intent to maximize cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in
enforcing federal immigration laws. To that end, they argue, the involvement of local law enforcement in immigration policing, as well as
efforts by state and local lawmakers to regulate in the area of immigration, are desirable and appropriate. On the other hand, proponents of
less state and local involvement in immigration enforcement, including
the Obama administration, have argued that the anti-sanctuary provisions
preempt certain state and local efforts to engage in immigration enforcement by drawing explicit limits on the nature of non-federal engagement in immigration enforcement. For example, in the lawsuit
brought by the United States against Arizona challenging the constitutionality of the Arizona Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070), the U.S. Department of Justice argued that § 2

14

See infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Hurtt, 893 F. Supp. 2d 817, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Sturgeon
v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 722–23 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Fonseca v. Fong, 84
Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 572 n.7 (Ct. App. 2008) (declining to address whether or not San
Francisco’s sanctuary policy conflicted with federal law).
16
See Appellants’ Opening Brief at 10–12, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339
(9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) (arguing that despite congressional intent to enforce
federal immigration laws, evidenced by the passage of §§ 1373 and 1644, interior
enforcement of illegal immigration is lacking due to inability or unwillingness on the
part of the federal government); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to
Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373,
1384–85 (2006); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)
(“[I]mmigration law enforcement is as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law
enforcement, and . . . illegal aliens do not have the right to remain in the United
States undetected and unapprehended.”).
15
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of S.B. 1070 was preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Section 2 requires police
officers to verify the immigration status of anyone stopped or detained
for any reason where the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the
18
person is unlawfully present in the United States. This mandatory status
check, the United States argued, was preempted because it stood as an
obstacle to federal–state cooperation envisioned by § 1373 by forcing officers to make status inquiries irrespective of whether such inquiries were
19
in line with the government’s immigration enforcement priorities.
This evolution of the use and meaning of the so-called anti-sanctuary
provisions reflects a deepening divide within the federal government and
between the federal government, the states, and the American public
around the issue of unauthorized immigration. Since the anti-sanctuary
provisions were enacted in 1996, the perception that federal government
efforts to vigorously enforce immigration laws and eliminate unauthorized immigration were being undermined by isolated pockets of state and
20
local “sanctuary” efforts, has been replaced by a perception that Con21
gress has repeatedly failed to fix a broken immigration system and,
more recently, that the Obama Administration has failed to enforce exist22
ing immigration laws. At the same time, though, the efforts of state and
17
See Brief for the United States at 51–52, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182).
18
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2012).
19
See Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 46–52.
20
See Criminal Aliens in the United States, S. Rep. No. 104-48, at 30 (1995)
(“[B]y adopting non-cooperation laws, local jurisdictions are making effective
governmental response to the problem of criminal aliens substantially more
difficult.”). The committee also suggested sanctions against localities with public noncooperation policies. Id. at 32.
21
See Editorial, Now’s Time to Undo ‘96’s Bad Immigration ‘Reform,’ Ariz. Republic,
Oct. 7, 2000, at B7, 2000 WLNR 10425454; Michael Riley, Failure of ‘86 Immigration
Reform Holds Lessons for Bush, Denver Post, Nov. 17, 2002, at A27; Press Release,
Office of Sen. Mel F. Martinez, Sens. Martinez, Obama Urge Comprehensive,
Realistic Immigration Reform (December 15, 2005) (U.S. Fed. News).
22
Elizabeth Price Foley, Opinion, Allowing Some Illegal Immigrants to Stay Abuses
Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2014/11/18/constitutional-limits-of-presidential-action-onimmigration-12/allowing-some-illegal-immigrants-to-stay-abuses-prosecutorialdiscretion; see also Nigel Duara & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Federal Judge Refuses to Lift
Injunction on Obama’s Immigration Order, L.A. Times (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-immigration-hanen-20150407-story.html; Jan
C. Ting, Opinion, Obama’s Own Words Refute His Stand on Immigration Authority, N.Y.
Times (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/11/18/
constitutional-limits-of-presidential-action-on-immigration-12/obamas-own-wordsrefute-his-stand-on-immigration-authority. But see Elise Foley, Backlash Against Mass
Family Immigrant Detention Grows as Senate Democrats Pile On, Huffington Post (June
2, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/family-immigrant-detention_
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local governments to respond to the worsening immigration crisis have
evolved and now include measures that seek to reinforce federal immigration enforcement, as well as those designed to protect unauthorized
immigrants from immigration enforcement. In some respects, and in
surprising ways, §§ 1644 and 1373—the so-called anti-sanctuary provisions—have been instrumental in the evolution of some state and local
immigration measures on both sides of the spectrum. This, in turn, has
led to even more confusion and frustration about the meaning of these
statutes and the meaning of sanctuary itself. This Article examines the
evolution of the use and meaning of the anti-sanctuary provisions in the
national immigration debate, and in particular in the struggle to define
the proper role for sub-federal actors in immigration enforcement.
Part II will explore the legal and political context in which the antisanctuary laws were enacted, including an examination of the extent to
which sub-federal noncooperation or sanctuary policies were actually in
effect and impacting federal enforcement efforts at the time the provisions became law, and also take a closer look at what the language of the
statutes says and means. Part III will examine the interpretations of
§§ 1644 and 1373 by federal and state courts considering local noncooperation policies and practices in context. This Part will begin with a discussion of the unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the anti-sanctuary
provisions brought by the City of New York in its effort to preserve the
city’s own sanctuary policy, an executive order prohibiting the disclosure
of immigration-related information to federal immigration authorities.
This Part will then consider the use of the federal anti-sanctuary
measures as the basis for a number of legal challenges, also largely unsuccessful, to state and local sanctuary provisions. Part IV will consider
the relationship between the federal anti-sanctuary provisions and other
federal privacy protections, examining interpretations of the antisanctuary statutes by federal agencies and courts charged with determining whether and how privacy protections in other federal laws might be
impacted by the anti-sanctuary provisions. Part V will look at the role of
the anti-sanctuary provisions in the proliferation of and challenges to
sub-federal efforts to enact immigration legislation and enforce federal
immigration law, including the legal challenge to Arizona’s S.B. 1070. In
particular, the discussion will examine the ways in which each party in
United States v. Arizona relied on §§ 1644 and 1373 as support for its position, and the federal courts’ reactions to those arguments.
The Article closes with discussion of the lessons learned two decades
after the anti-sanctuary provisions became law, what the statutes mean

n_7495282.html; Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor
Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html.
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and what they don’t, and how they are situated in the ongoing debate
over unauthorized immigration and immigration reform. With these lessons in mind, the Article then turns to a discussion of the anti-sanctuary
statutes in the context of Kate Steinle’s killing and San Francisco’s sanctuary law, ultimately concluding that the anti-sanctuary statutes and the
anti-sanctuary approach to immigration enforcement have been largely
ineffective, and have diverted resources away from meaningful enforcement and critically needed reforms to the federal immigration system.
II. THE PATH FROM SANCTUARY TO ANTI-SANCTUARY
A great deal of scholarship to date has focused on the propriety of
sanctuary or noncooperation measures enacted by state and municipal
23
governments. In particular, this scholarship has considered how and
whether non-federal governments and entities may enact—consistent
with the U.S. Constitution and federal law—laws, resolutions, and policies which restrict the ability of state and local actors to engage in the enforcement of federal immigration laws or to cooperate with federal gov24
ernment enforcement efforts. In doing so, these scholars have
examined the history and origins of the sanctuary movement, beginning
with a campaign in the 1980s and 1990s to offer protection to refugees
from El Salvador and Guatemala whose legitimate claims for asylum in
25
the United States were systematically denied. They have also described
how this initially church-led campaign evolved into an effort joined by
cities and towns across the country who were sympathetic to the cause of
Latin American refugees and who wanted to offer support and protection
to these communities by declaring themselves sanctuaries or refuges
26
from federal immigration enforcement. Finally, they have considered
how, in recent history, the sanctuary or “new” sanctuary movement has
23

See, e.g., Hing, supra note 12; Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary
Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 Pepp. L. Rev. 297 (1989);
Pham, supra note 16; Ruti Teitel, Debating Conviction Against Conviction—Constitutional
Considerations on the Sanctuary Movement, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 25 (1986); Rose
Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 573
(2010).
24
See, e.g., Hing, supra note 12, at 309–10; Pham, supra note 16, at 1382; see also
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration
Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1683, 1685 (2009).
25
See John Fife, From the Sanctuary Movement to No More Deaths, in Religious and
Ethical Perspectives on Global Migration 257, 257–64 (Elizabeth W. Collier &
Charles R. Strain eds., 2014); see also Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an
Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 747, 747–48 (1986); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU
L. Rev. 133, 139–42 (2008).
26
See Carro, supra note 23, at 297; Villazor, supra note 25, at 142.
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expanded to include cities and municipalities and entities within them,
most notably law enforcement agencies that have adopted policies that
limit or prohibit involvement in federal immigration enforcement efforts
in order to protect public safety and preserve relationships with the im27
migrant community. This Article narrows the focus of the sanctuary
scholarship to a consideration of the anti-sanctuary phenomenon that
emerged in response to the sanctuary movement and subsequent sanctuary policies. The starting point and recurring reference point for this discussion are the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373.
At the time §§ 1644 and 1373 were enacted in 1996, more than two
28
dozen sanctuary measures had been adopted by U.S. cities and states.
Many of these measures were adopted, at least initially, as expressions of
support for the plight of unauthorized immigrants, primarily asylum
seekers from Latin America, seeking protection and a right to remain in
29
the United States. However, by 1996, many of these state and local sanctuary measures were not put in place out of opposition to federal immigration enforcement practices. Rather, the almost universal public justification for these efforts by states and cities to protect immigration status
information from disclosure was promoting the health and safety of the
30
entire community, including unauthorized immigrant residents. These
measures included resolutions, municipal ordinances, executive orders
31
and proclamations, and, in some cases, state legislative actions. They included expressions of solidarity with immigrants seeking asylum protection; directives to government employees, including police officers, to refrain from sharing immigration status information or cooperating with
federal immigration officials; and laws providing access to state driver’s
licenses and municipal identification cards to all residents regardless of
32
immigration status. Among the jurisdictions with sanctuary policies or
27

See Hing, supra note 12, at 254–55; Pham, supra note 16, at 1398.
See Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting
Local Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 La Raza L.J. 50, 51–52 (1994).
29
Carro, supra note 23, at 297–98; Hing, supra note 12, at 253; Pham, supra note
16, at 1382–83; see Chi., Ill., Mun. Code 2-173-005 (2015); S.F., Cal., Admin. Code
§ 12H.2 (2015); see also S.J. Res. 19, 59th Leg. (Mont. 2005); N.M. Exec. Order No.
2005-019 (Apr. 7, 2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 181.850(1) (2014). But see Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 67.307.2 (West 2014); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j (West 2015); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-9-1006 (LexisNexis 2012); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 2006); Prince
William County, Va., Resolution 07–894 (Oct. 16, 2007).
30
Hing, supra note 12, at 253; Villazor, supra note 23, at 593–94; see also Patrick J.
McDonnell, Law Could Alter Role of Police on Immigration, L.A. Times (Sept. 30, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-30/news/mn-49038_1_illegal-immigrants (“All
of these efforts stemmed from a fundamental principle: the need to encourage new
arrivals—many lacking papers and hailing from troubled homelands where police
were often thieves and torturers—to come forward and report crimes.”).
31
Carro, supra note 23, at 305–15; Pham, supra note 16, at 1388–89.
32
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-36m(b)(1) (West 2014); Newark, N.J.,
28
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laws in place in 1996 were New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, San
33
Francisco, New York State, and New Mexico. Their resistance to involvement with federal immigration enforcement did not go unnoticed.
In August 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the federal Welfare Re34
form Act, which included numerous provisions limiting access to public
benefits for non-citizens. Among the immigration-related provisions was
§ 434, entitled “Communication Between State and Local Government
Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” which be35
came part of federal law at 8 U.S.C. § 1644, and provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any
way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration
and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.36

The congressional record provides useful insight into the intended
scope of the provision and makes clear that Congress’s intent was to encourage, but not require, communication between state and local governments and federal immigration authorities:
The conference agreement provides that no State or local government entity shall prohibit, or in any way restrict, any entity or official from sending to or receiving from the INS information regarding the immigration status of an alien or the presence,
whereabouts, or activities of illegal aliens. It does not require, in
and of itself, any government agency or law enforcement official to
communicate with the INS.
The conferees intend to give State and local officials the authority
to communicate with the INS regarding the presence, whereabouts,
or activities of illegal aliens. This provision is designed to prevent
Ordinance 15-0804 (May 20, 2015); N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 3-115(c)(2) (2015);
S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12.H; Takoma Park, Md., Mun. Code § 9.04.010 (2015).
33
See N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 3-115(c)(2); Chi., Ill., Municipal Code 2-173005; S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12.H; N.M. Exec. Order No. 2005-019 (Apr. 7, 2005);
L.A. Police Dep’t, Special Order No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979), http://assets.lapdonline.
org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf.
34
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. Congress had twice previously tried to enact antisanctuary measures. See S. 1607, 103d Cong. § 725 (1993); H.R. 5255, 102d Cong.
(1992); see also Rudolph W. Giuliani, Address, Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 4 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 165, 168 (1996)
(“As I have said, this idea [revoking noncooperation ordinances] has long been
debated in Congress and there have been at least two other attempts to revoke [New
York City’s Executive Order 124], both of which have been defeated.”).
35
§ 434, 110 Stat. at 2275.
36
Id.
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any State or local law, ordinance, executive order, policy, constitutional provision, or decision of any Federal or State court that prohibits or in any way restricts any communication between State and
local officials and the INS. The conferees believe that immigration
law enforcement is as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law
enforcement, and that illegal aliens do not have the right to remain
in the United States undetected and unapprehended.37

A similar measure was enacted several weeks later as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA). This provision, IIRIRA § 642(a), entitled “Communication Between Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service,” is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and provides:
(a) In General
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional Authority of Government Entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal,
State, or local government entity from doing any of the following
with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful
or unlawful, of any individual:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such
information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or
local government entity.
(c) Obligation to Respond to Inquiries
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to
verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.38

IIRIRA § 642, while also focusing on intergovernmental communication, included broader language encompassing a greater array of gov37

H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 342, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707.
38
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ernment actors and protected activities, as well as an explicit mandate to
federal immigration authorities to respond to inquiries about immigration status from federal, state, and local government agencies. A Senate
committee report accompanying the legislation states, in reference to
this section, that it:
Prohibits any restriction on the exchange of information between
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and any Federal, State,
or local agency regarding a person’s immigration status. Effective
immigration law enforcement requires a cooperative effort between
all levels of government. The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related information by State and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of considerable assistance to,
the Federal regulation of immigration and the achieving of the
purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.39

The text and commentary to both anti-sanctuary provisions make
clear that these provisions were intended to facilitate immigration-related
information sharing in support of federal immigration enforcement efforts. In the context of the Welfare Reform Act, § 1644 formed part of a
concerted effort to make drastic cuts in federal welfare programs by limiting access by all non-citizens, not just unauthorized immigrants, to feder40
al public benefits. Indeed, eliminating access to benefit programs by legal permanent residents alone would result in the lion’s share of the
41
budget savings wrought by the Welfare Reform Act. Although the Welfare Reform Act most dramatically impacted access to public benefits for
green card holders, it also reiterated and formalized the ineligibility of
undocumented immigrants for virtually all public-benefit programs in
42
the United States. In that vein, § 1644 confirmed Congress’s intent to

39

S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996).
Dolores Acevedo-Garcia et al., U.S. Comm’n on Immigr. Reform, Impact
of Federal Welfare Reform on Immigrants 1 (July 28, 1997), https://www.
utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/respapers/iot-jul97.pdf (“Title IV of [the Welfare Reform Act]
sets forth new requirements on the states to discontinue benefits and deny eligibility
for federal, state and local welfare programs to specific classes of immigrants,
including qualified immigrants, non-qualified immigrants, and illegal immigrants.”).
41
Audrey Singer, Welfare Reform and Immigrants: A Policy Review, in Immigrants,
Welfare Reform, and the Poverty of Policy 21, 25 (Philip Kretsedemas & Ana
Aparicio eds., 2004) (“The welfare law was projected to save the federal government
$54.1 billion over six years. The largest savings—$23.8 billion or 44 percent of the net
savings—was to come from slashing benefits to legal permanent residents (green card
holders). Legal immigrants, including those who were participating in the programs
at the time the law became effective, became ineligible for most federally funded
programs.”).
42
Excluded from benefits under the Welfare Reform Act are “undocumented
immigrants, asylum applicants, immigrants formerly considered ‘permanently
40
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ensure that all non-citizens, but perhaps especially unauthorized immigrants, accessing or thinking about accessing public benefits would be
subject to information sharing with and, ultimately, enforcement action
43
by federal immigration authorities.
But the scope of § 1644 was not limited to the public-benefit arena.
Section 1644 banned restrictions on immigration-related information
sharing by any state or local government entity, including existing state
and local restrictions on information sharing related to law enforcement,
education, and public health functions. Of the more than two dozen
sanctuary measures then in place, a number of them contained restrictions on sharing immigration-related information with federal immi44
gration authorities that would be prohibited by § 1644.
It is also evident that in enacting § 1644, Congress perceived that
certain state and local measures restricting disclosure of immigrationrelated information had been adopted in order to avoid the loss of funding under existing federal laws that specifically prohibited disclosure of
certain categories of protected information, including immigration status
information:
The confidentiality provisions of various State statutes may prohibit
disclosure of immigration status obtained under them. Some Federal laws, including the Family Education Rights and Protection
Act, may deny funds to certain State and local agencies that disclose
a protected individual’s immigration status. Various localities have
enacted laws preventing local officials from disclosing the immigration status of individuals to INS.45

The conference report specifically mentions the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which restricts and penalizes unauthor46
ized disclosure of educational records. However, other federal laws already in place in 1996 and still in effect today also prohibit disclosure of
certain types of confidential information except in limited circumstances,
and impose penalties, including loss of federal funding for unauthorized
disclosures. In addition to educational records, federal law restricts or
residing under color of law’ . . . as well as those with temporary status such as students
and tourists.” Id. at 23.
43
See id. at 26 (“For their part, immigrants had to confront their precarious place
in American society. Many immigrants felt vulnerable, including those who had never
participated in U.S. welfare programs.”).
44
See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t, Special Order No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979), http://assets.
lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf; see also McDonnell, supra note 30 (“The
trailblazing LAPD policy, enacted after intense community pressure, generally
prevents officers from quizzing anyone about their immigration status, checking with
the INS or turning suspects accused of minor violations over to immigration
authorities. (The major exception involves those who commit serious crimes.)”).
45
H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 391 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
46
See infra Part IV.B.
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47

prohibits disclosure of protected information including health records,
48
49
50
census records, driver’s license records, and tax records, all of which
might include information relating to immigration status. As discussed in
Part IV, infra, state and local entities and officials covered by the federal
anti-sanctuary statutes would undoubtedly also be subject to these federal
privacy protections.
The anti-sanctuary provision in IIRIRA, like its counterpart in the
Welfare Reform Act, formed part of a broader legislative effort intended
to prevent non-citizens, particularly unauthorized immigrants, from ac51
cessing government benefits and services. Beyond that, IIRIRA was designed to crack down on unauthorized immigration through tighter border controls, expansion of detention capacity, streamlined removal
procedures, employer sanctions, and penalties for fraud and abuse in asy52
lum and parole procedures. Faced with increasing levels of unauthor53
ized immigration, Congress sought to expand enforcement capacity by
encouraging information sharing and other forms of cooperation within
the federal government and between the federal government and state
54
and local governments. While the text of § 1373 clearly expresses Congress’s intent to encourage open communication of immigration-related
information among all levels and branches of government, the legislative
commentary also reveals Congress’s frustration with certain “Americans,”
47

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d–6 (2012).
48
13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(2012).
49
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012).
50
26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).
51
See S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 3 (1996) (“The committee bill is needed to address
the high current levels of illegal immigration . . . and the substantial burden imposed
on the taxpayers of this country as the result of aliens’ use of welfare and other
government benefits.”).
52
Id. at 2.
53
See id. at 3 (“No matter how successful Congress might be in crafting a set of
immigration laws that would—in theory—lead to the most long-term benefits to the
American people, such benefits will not actually occur if those laws cannot be
enforced. Unfortunately, U.S. immigration law is violated on a massive scale.”).
54
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707; see also § 133, 110 Stat. at 3009-563
(authorizing the Attorney General to enter into written agreements with a state, or
any political subdivision of a state, to permit specially trained state officers to arrest
and detain aliens); § 623, 110 Stat. at 3009-697 (requiring the Attorney General to
release information provided to the INS by an alien in connection with an
application for legalization or the special-agricultural-work program in order to assist
law enforcement authorities with a criminal investigation or to assist in the
identification of a deceased person); § 656, 110 Stat. at 3009-716 to -719 (establishing
federal standards for birth certificates and state-issued driver’s licenses and grants for
states to facilitate the matching of birth and death records).
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including members of the federal judiciary, who were perceived as not
55
fully supporting federal efforts to enforce immigration law. Consequently, IIRIRA’s anti-sanctuary provision is more expansive than that in § 1644
of the Welfare Reform Act, applying not just to state and local government entities but to federal entities as well, and protecting communication of immigration-related information among non-federal entities as
56
well as with federal immigration authorities. Additionally, § 1373 contains a provision which further encourages immigration-related information sharing by requiring federal immigration officials to respond to
communications from federal, state, and local government agencies seeking information about or verification of the immigration status of any in57
dividual for any purpose authorized by law.
Almost immediately after they were enacted, it was understood that
§§ 1644 and 1373 were intended to target so-called sanctuary measures
promulgated by states and localities in order to ensure that their undocumented immigrant residents were not deterred from reporting crimes,
seeking medical care, or enrolling in public schools out of fear of immi58
gration enforcement. In New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles,
where long-standing policies prohibiting disclosure of immigrationrelated information were in place, there was concern about the impact
that the federal anti-sanctuary provisions would have on those communi59
ties. Most understood the anti-sanctuary provisions as invalidating state
55

See S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 7 (“At this point, there is a fundamental committee
intent that should be clearly expressed—an intent that should be taken into account
in the interpretation of every provision of this bill. The committee intends that aliens
within the jurisdiction of this country be required to fully obey all State and Federal
laws—including the immigration laws. Some Americans appear to be ambivalent
about the enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This includes a
number of judges, perhaps reflecting a tension they feel between their duty to apply
the law and their inclination to be humane toward those seeking a better life in this
country, in accordance with our immigrant heritage. For example, while the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that the making of immigration policy is reserved to
the political branches under our constitutional system and should be largely immune
from judicial control, and that relief from deportation may be left to the unfettered
discretion of the Attorney General, the Court on other occasions has characterized
deportation as a grave penalty and suggested that statutory ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of the alien. If the United States is to have an immigration policy
that is both fair and effective, the law and the commitment of those with the duty to
apply or enforce it must be clear. There should be no confusion about the intent of
Congress that U.S. immigration law be fully binding on all persons at or within the
borders of this country. This is a nation governed by law, and the law includes the
immigration statutes and the regulations promulgated thereunder.” (internal
citations omitted)).
56
8 U.S.C § 1373(b) (2012).
57
Id. § 1373(c).
58
See McDonnell, supra note 30.
59
Id.; see, e.g., Giuliani, supra note 34, at 165 (describing § 1644 as an attempt to
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and local measures that prohibited public agencies and employees from
60
sharing immigration information. However, some public officials and
news reports initially understood the federal statutes as mandating re61
porting of immigration information to the federal government. Whatever initial uncertainty or misunderstanding may have existed about the
meaning and effect of the federal anti-sanctuary provisions, it does not
appear that any state or municipality voluntarily rescinded or revised an
existing sanctuary measure upon their enactment. Perhaps because it was
unclear how or whether the anti-sanctuary measures would be enforced,
62
most sanctuary jurisdictions seemed to take a “wait and see” approach.
One jurisdiction, New York City, was unwilling to wait and on September
11, 1996, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani announced that the City of New York
63
would challenge the anti-sanctuary provisions in court.
III. THE FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY PROVISIONS IN THE BATTLE
AGAINST SANCTUARY
Following the enactment of the anti-sanctuary provisions, some predicted dire consequences for public safety and health in communities
64
where sanctuary provisions were then in place. Others applauded the
measures and eagerly awaited the opportunity to exercise this apparently
reverse a New York City executive order “in existance since 1988 stating that New
York City will create a zone of protection for illegal and undocumented immigrants
who are seeking the protection of the police, or seeking medical services because they
are sick, or attempting to or actually putting their children in public schools so they
can be educated”); see also 142 Cong. Rec. S10712–13 (daily ed. Sept 17, 1996)
(statement of Senator Moynihan) (“[S]ection 434 . . . poses a serious threat to health
and safety in New York City and elsewhere.”).
60
See McDonnell, supra note 30 (“The new welfare statute expressly voids federal,
state and local laws prohibiting state and local agencies from exchanging information
with the INS.”).
61
See id. (quoting Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan saying “I have a big
problem making schools and local police departments the ones who are responsible
for policing illegal immigration.”).
62
See, e.g., id. (“Until the matter is clarified, LAPD officials have no plans to alter
their policy of generally not inquiring about people’s immigration status . . . . ‘We do
not want to discourage the community from coming forward.’”).
63
David Firestone, Giuliani to Sue over Provision on Welfare, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1996, at B1.
64
David Firestone, Mayoral Order on Immigrants Is Struck Down, N.Y. Times, July 19,
1997, at 21 (“Last September, in announcing that he would sue the Federal
Government over the provision, the Mayor said that ending the executive order
would ‘create chaos in New York City.’ Without an iron-clad guarantee that they
would not be turned in, illegal immigrants might refuse to send their children to
school, report crimes to the police or seek treatment for contagious diseases, he
said.”).
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unrestricted authority to share information with federal immigration au65
thorities. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of uncertainty about how
66
the provisions would be enforced, and some opponents of the antisanctuary measures predicted that the federal government would never
enforce the laws, that their only purpose was to create fear and apprehension (and ultimately self-deportation) in immigrant communities
67
about increased enforcement at all levels of government. As it turns out,
the federal government never took affirmative steps to enforce the antisanctuary provisions or to invalidate a state or local sanctuary law. Even
so, §§ 1644 and 1373 have been at the center of numerous legal challenges involving sub-federal sanctuary measures in the almost two decades since they became law.
A. City of New York v. United States: §§ 1644 and 1373 Survive a
Constitutional Challenge
In August 1989, Edward Koch, then Mayor of New York City, issued
Executive Order 124. The order, entitled “City Policy Concerning Aliens,” was subsequently reissued by Mayor David Dinkins and Mayor Giu68
liani, and provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of Information Respecting Aliens.

65
McDonnell, supra note 30 (quoting California Governor Pete Wilson regarding
his plan to immediately implement the mandates of the anti-sanctuary provisions:
“We fully intend to use the new authority that has been conferred on the state and
local governments to deny services to those who are illegally in the country and
report them to the INS, hopefully for return back to their country of origin”); see also
Michael Grunwald, Illegal Alien List Dilemma for Reformers; Overhaul Mandates INS Access
to Names of Welfare Recipients, Bos. Globe, Dec. 12, 1996, at A1 (quoting Massachusetts
Governor William F. Weld’s welfare commissioner regarding new requirements that
state and local agencies report immigration-related information about individuals
seeking welfare benefits: “I don’t have any problem releasing this information[.] . . .
These people are in this country illegally. I don’t see why we shouldn’t let the INS
know about that.”).
66
See McDonnell, supra note 30 (“[T]he law contains no mechanisms to enforce
the provision, and it remains unclear what kind of enforcement, if any, would
emerge.”).
67
Giuliani, supra note 34, at 169 (“So it seems to us that this provision is another
‘not-real’ attempt to control immigration in a useful way, but creates a sense of fear as
well as disincentives because the reality is that all the names, if we are required to
turn them in, will just be added to a very big pile. The overwhelming majority of
people will face a type of Russian roulette where some will be deported and some will
not be deported. So you create this catastrophic setting, but in no way are you
affecting the number of people, at least the present population of illegal and
undocumented immigrants, that are here.”).
68
See Hing, supra note 12, at 259.
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a. No City officer or employee shall transmit information respecting
any alien to federal immigration authorities unless
(1) such officer’s or employee’s agency is required by law to disclose information respecting such alien, or
(2) such agency has been authorized, in writing signed by such alien, to verify such alien’s immigration status, or
(3) such alien is suspected by such agency of engaging in criminal
activity, including an attempt to obtain public assistance benefits
through the use of fraudulent documents.
b. Each agency shall designate one or more officers or employees
who shall be responsible for receiving reports from such agency’s
line workers on aliens suspected of criminal activity and for determining, on a case by case basis, what action, if any, to take on such
reports. No such determination shall be made by any line worker,
nor shall any line worker transmit information respecting any alien
directly to federal immigration authorities.
c. Enforcement agencies, including the Police Department and the
Department of Correction, shall continue to cooperate with federal
authorities in investigating and apprehending aliens suspected of
criminal activity. However, such agencies shall not transmit to federal authorities information respecting any alien who is the victim
of a crime.69

The commentary issued with the order made clear that the City’s
goal in issuing the order was to encourage all residents, including unauthorized immigrants, to utilize health, police and educational services, as
70
a matter of public welfare. It also articulated the City’s understanding
that immigration enforcement was a federal obligation and that the City
was not obliged, except in limited circumstances, to provide immigration71
related information to federal immigration authorities. In balancing

69

N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124, § 2 (Aug. 7, 1989), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/records/pdf/executive_orders/1989EO124.PDF.
70
Id. at 3 (“Many services provided by New York City, including education and
police protection, are available to all City residents regardless of their citizenship or
immigration status. However, many aliens who reside in the City fail to make use of
such services, largely from fear that any contact with a government agency will bring
them to the attention of federal immigration authorities. It is to the disadvantage of
all City residents if some who live in the City are uneducated, inadequately protected
from crime, or untreated for illness. Regardless of their immigration status, aliens
should not be discouraged from utilizing those City services to which they are
entitled. On the contrary, the public welfare requires that they be encouraged to do
so. Yet many aliens will continue to avoid City agencies as long as they fear that they
will be reported to federal immigration authorities.”).
71
Id. (“Federal law places full responsibility for immigration control on the
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this understanding with the City’s interest in protecting public health
and safety, the order prohibited disclosure of immigration-related information except (1) where otherwise required by law, (2) where the individual involved consented to the disclosure, or (3) where the individual
72
was suspected of criminal activity. The order also required that only designated city officials or employees would be authorized to make a deci73
sion to report immigration information to federal authorities. In this
way, the order prevented ad hoc reporting by city employees and allowed
designated city officials to decide when and whether to report information on a case-by-case basis. By limiting the discretion of individual
employees to share immigration-related information, the order protected
unauthorized immigrant residents from the uncertainty and fear of being
reported to immigration authorities whenever they came in contact with
74
city employees or accessed a city service.
In early October 1996, as Mayor Giuliani had promised, the City of
New York filed a lawsuit bringing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of §§ 1644 and 1373. New York City alleged that the anti-sanctuary pro75
visions violated principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment and
76
Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution because they
“(1) . . . directly prohibit States and localities from engaging in the central sovereign process of passing laws or otherwise determining policy;
and (2) they usurp States’ and local governments’ administration of core
functions of government, including the provision of police protection

federal government. With limited exceptions, the City therefore has no legal
obligation to report any alien to federal authorities. The executive order, in
recognition of this lack of obligation and the importance of providing the services
covered herein, requires City agencies to preserve the confidentiality of all
information respecting law-abiding aliens to the extent permitted by law.”).
72
Id. § 2(a).
73
Id. § 2(b).
74
See Giuliani, supra note 34, at 168 (“The illegal and undocumented parent
seeking to put her child in school would not know if a teacher would report her to
the INS or not. So [§ 1644] would have precisely the impact the order intended to
avoid. It would make illegal and undocumented immigrants wary of contact with the
government for basic services they need to protect themselves as well as the rest of the
population.”); see also Firestone, supra note 64, at 22 (“[T]he Mayor said the welfare
law provision would have the same effect as requiring teachers to report illegal
immigrants, because the immigrants, not knowing which of the city’s 200,000
employees might decide to report them, would assume that any employee might turn
them in.”).
75
U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”).
76
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
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77

and regulation of their own workforces.” New York City first argued that
the anti-sanctuary provisions violated the Tenth Amendment by forbidding state and local governments from controlling how they use immigra78
tion-related information gathered in the course of official business.
While the City did not dispute that the federal government has plenary
power to legislate in the area of immigration, it contended that the
Tenth Amendment prohibited the federal government from exercising
that power in a way that prevented states and local governments from enacting laws and policies that restrict their employees from cooperating
79
with federal immigration. The City argued that by prohibiting the City
from ordering City employees to keep immigration-related information
confidential, the anti-sanctuary provisions compelled the City to bear the
political responsibility for ad hoc immigration reporting by City officials
80
that is compelled by the federal government. The City relied on New
81
82
York v. United States and Printz v. United States to argue that the City had
the authority to choose to not participate in a federal regulatory program
and to prohibit city employees from voluntarily providing information to
83
federal immigration authorities. In New York and Printz, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal government could neither compel
84
states to enact legislation to enforce a federal program, nor coerce
85
states into enforcing a federal law.

77
City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d,
179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
78
Id. at 794.
79
City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1999).
80
City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 794.
81
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
82
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
83
See Appellants’ Brief at 41, City of New York, 179 F.3d 29 (No. 97-6182) (“When
Congress desires to regulate in areas where it has authority under the Constitution, it
must do so directly and cannot conscript State and local governments to do its
bidding.” (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 935)); see also id. at 43 (“While Congress, short of
outright coercion, may encourage a State to conform to federal policy choices, the
residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will
comply.” (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 167–68)).
84
New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (“As an initial matter, Congress may not simply
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’” (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))).
85
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress
cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States’ officers directly. The
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”).
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the City’s reliance on Printz and New York. The court distinguished the 1996 antisanctuary provisions from the laws at issue in Printz and New York, which
“conscripted states (or their officers) to enact or administer federal regulatory programs” and reallocated federal enforcement and administrative
responsibilities to the states, thus “diminish[ing] the political accounta86
bility of both state and federal officers.” With regard to the antisanctuary provisions, the Second Circuit found that Congress had not
forced state and local governments to enact or administer any federal
regulatory program, nor conscripted them into federal government ser87
vice. Indeed, the court found that the anti-sanctuary statutes did not directly compel states or localities to do anything, but rather prohibited
state and local governments “only from directly restricting the voluntary
exchange of immigration information” with federal immigration authori88
ties. The court found that the Tenth Amendment did not give states or
localities “an untrammeled right to forbid all voluntary cooperation with
particular federal programs,” pointing out that a “system of dual sovereignties cannot work without informed, extensive, and cooperative interaction of a voluntary nature between sovereign systems for the mutual
89
benefit of each system.”
New York City’s second argument was that the anti-sanctuary provisions improperly interfered with the City’s control of confidential information gathered in the course of official business and of the actions of its
employees in connection with that information. The City argued that the
ability to establish policies that assure access to vital services by all residents, including unauthorized immigrants, was central to its police pow90
er. Depriving the City of the ability to guarantee residents that information about immigration status would be kept confidential was, the City
argued, an unconstitutional interference with the City’s authority to “preserve public order and to protect the health, safety and well-being of its
91
residents.” With respect to the City’s ability to control employee disclo86

City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 35.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Appellants’ Brief at 24, City of New York, 179 F.3d 29 (No. 97-6182) (“The
exercise of police powers to protect the health, safety, good order and general
welfare of the people is the chief purpose of local government, and has never been
surrendered to the federal government. Police powers are inherent in the States and
their political subdivisions, reserved to them by the Constitution, and necessary to
their existence as separate and independent governments.”).
91
Id. at 37; see also id. at 29 (“This executive order was issued to protect the
health, safety and well-being of all New York City residents by assuring the
confidentiality of law-abiding immigrants, many of whom were not seeking medical
attention, reporting crimes, or sending their children to school for ‘fear that any
87
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sure of confidential immigration-related information, the City contended
that such information, gathered by City employees as part of their official
duties, was the property of the City and that the mayor had the authority
to “establish policy prohibiting City employees, who do not have the expertise or authority to determine immigration status, to make ad hoc decisions regarding that status . . . [and to] forbid City employees from us92
ing City time and resources to report law-abiding immigrants to INS.”
The nature of state sovereignty depends, the City contended, on the
power of local government to set policy and to control internal processes
and procedures, including “the ability to control City employees and to
93
assign their duties.” Without such authority, the City argued, it would
not be possible to maintain the “open and honest communications . . .
essential to the preservation of health, prevention of crime and the pro94
tection of the public welfare.” Executive Order 124 was, according to
the City, a legitimate exercise of the City’s police powers, and this power
was not subordinate to the federal government’s authority over immigra95
tion.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the City on two points. First, the
court agreed with the City that without an expectation of privacy the City
could be hindered in obtaining information necessary to a wide variety of
city functions, and that preserving confidentiality could also require re96
stricting the disclosure of such information by City employees. The
court also agreed with the City that §§ 1644 and 1373 did in fact interfere
with the City’s control over confidential information and its employees’
97
use of that information. However, the court found that the City had
contact with a government agency will bring them to the attention of federal
immigration authorities.’” (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124, at 3 (Aug. 7,
1989), http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/executive_orders/1989EO124.pdf)).
92
Id. at 37.
93
Id. at 38 (“Whatever the outer limits of state sovereignty may be, it surely
encompasses the right to set the duties of office for state-created officials and to
regulate the internal affairs of governmental bodies[.]” (quoting Koog v. United
States, 79 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1996))).
94
Id. at 37.
95
Id. at 32 (“The People of the States did not confer authority upon Congress to
subordinate their health, safety and well-being to the regulation of immigrants in
accordance with congressionally-imposed rules. No matter how powerful the federal
interest may be, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to
conduct its business in a fashion such as to inflict injury upon the public, or to
obstruct the operations of municipal government directed at protecting the public.
The power of Congress to regulate immigration was not intended as an authority to
control local governments in the exercise of their police powers over local matters,
always existing and carefully reserved to them in the Tenth Amendment.”).
96
City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999).
97
Id.
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failed to show that the anti-sanctuary provisions constituted an impermissible intrusion on the City’s authority to control the use of confidential
information and to determine how such information will be handled by
98
City employees. In particular, because Executive Order 124 was the only
city policy the City claimed was disrupted by §§ 1644 and 1373, and because Executive Order 124 did not prevent voluntary sharing of immigration-related information with anyone other than federal immigration
agencies and officers, the court concluded that Executive Order 124 was
99
not integral to the functions of city government. The court applied a
balancing test between the anti-sanctuary statutes’ interference with the
City’s interests and the executive order’s interference with federal policy
and decided that, in the context of the City’s facial challenge, the anti100
sanctuary provisions were valid.
In City of New York, the fate of state and local sanctuary provisions
that prohibit voluntary immigration-related information sharing with
federal immigration authorities was sealed. Such provisions are preempt101
ed by the anti-sanctuary statutes. However, the court’s opinion in this
case left open a number of questions with respect to the interaction of
the anti-sanctuary statutes and sub-federal sanctuary provisions. First, the
court’s opinion in City of New York explicitly left open the question of
whether the federal anti-sanctuary provisions would survive a challenge in
the context of a more generalized city policy protecting confidential information that included but was not limited to immigration infor102
mation. In the wake of the Second Circuit’s decision, the City of New
York revoked Executive Order 124, putting in place a new order which
incorporated privacy protections for immigration-related information into a more generalized privacy policy that applies to a broader category of
103
information in a variety of contexts. To emphasize the importance of
98

Id.
Id. at 36–37.
100
Id. at 37 (“On its face, [the Executive Order] singles out a particular federal
policy for non-cooperation while allowing City employees to share freely the
information in question with the rest of the world. It imposes a policy of no-voluntarycooperation that does not protect confidential information generally but does
operate to reduce the effectiveness of a federal policy.”).
101
Anne B. Chandler, Why Is the Policeman Asking for My Visa? The Future of
Federalism and Immigration Enforcement, 15 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 209, 214–15
(2008). But see Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?,
161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 178 (2012) (“[F]ederal demands for information should be
considered prohibited commandeering. In all important respects, the
commandeering of the states’ information-gathering services is indistinguishable
from the commandeering of other law enforcement services.”).
102
City of New York, 179 F.3d at 37.
103
N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 41, §§ 1–2 (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.nyc.
gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/eo-41.pdf (defining confidential information to
include sexual orientation, status as a sexual assault victim, tax record information,
99
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confidentiality to the city’s essential functions, the preamble to the new
executive order incorporated language tracking almost verbatim the Second Circuit’s acknowledgement in New York v. United States of the substantial burdens that could be placed on the city by the anti-sanctuary
statutes:
Whereas, the obtaining of pertinent information, which is essential
to the performance of a wide variety of government functions, may
in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of confidentiality is not preserved, and preserving confidentiality in turn
requires that governments regulate the use of such information by
their employees . . . .104

The court’s decision in City of New York also did not address sanctuary
provisions that prohibit the gathering, rather than the sharing of confidential immigration-related information. A number of jurisdictions, including New York City in the aftermath of the court’s decision here, have
put in place “don’t ask” provisions, presumably with the purpose of limiting the collection of immigration-related information that would be sub105
ject to the voluntary disclosures encouraged by §§ 1644 and 1373. New
York City’s Executive Order 41, still in effect today, no longer prohibits
immigration-related information sharing but instead prohibits city employees, except in limited circumstances, from inquiring about immigra106
tion status.
Finally, despite New York City’s serious concerns that the antisanctuary provisions deterred unauthorized immigrant residents from
seeking health services or sending children to school, City of New York v.
United States did not address the question, discussed infra Part III, of
whether the anti-sanctuary provisions permit voluntary disclosure of immigration-related information that is protected by other federal confidentiality provisions. In other words, even if §§ 1644 and 1373 block state
and local governments from prohibiting sharing of immigration-related
information with federal immigration authorities, are there other legal
prohibitions on information sharing that render such disclosures unlawful?

immigration status, and status as recipient of public assistance; and prohibiting
disclosure, with certain exceptions, to anyone, not just to federal immigration
authorities as in Executive Order 124).
104
Id. § 1.
105
Id. § 3 (prohibiting inquiries into immigration status except where necessary
to determine eligibility for public benefits or as required by law); id. § 4(c) (declaring
policy of not inquiring regarding the immigration status of crime victims, witnesses,
and others assisting an investigation).
106
Id. § 3.
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The answers to these questions would come in the years following
City of New York v. United States in the course of subsequent legal challenges to state and municipal sanctuary provisions.
B. Defining the Limits of the Anti-Sanctuary Provisions
Following the court’s decision in New York v. United States, it would be
several years before any other court considered the meaning and scope
of §§ 1644 and 1373 in the context of a sub-federal sanctuary provision or
practice. Though there were a number of sanctuary laws and policies already in place in 1996, that number continued to grow in the aftermath
of IIRIRA’s call for enhanced state and local involvement in immigration
107
enforcement and the release of a controversial Department of Justice
opinion declaring that local police had “inherent authority” to enforce
108
federal immigration laws. In response to this increased pressure to engage them in immigration enforcement activities, dozens of cities, states
and law enforcement agencies adopted policies making clear that immi109
gration enforcement was not their responsibility. This surge in sanctuary policies led, unsurprisingly, to new legal challenges.
1. Claims for Damages Under §§ 1644 and 1373
Among the first legal challenges involving the federal anti-sanctuary
provisions were several seeking damages for injuries to private citizens

107
In addition to barring states and localities from imposing restrictions on
immigration-related information sharing through § 1373, IIRIRA contained a
provision establishing a program through which local law enforcement agencies
could enter in to agreements with ICE that enabled local officers to be trained to
enforce federal immigration law under ICE’s supervision. Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009546, 3009-563 to -564 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)).
108
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y General, to the Att’y General
(Apr. 3, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf.
Attorney General John Ashcroft relied on this memo to support a request for
assistance from state and local police in the enforcement of civil immigration
violations. This opinion was a reversal of a long-standing DOJ position that state and
local police could not enforce non-criminal provisions of federal immigration law.
The change in position caused concern among immigrant advocates and law
enforcement agencies who believed that increased involvement in immigration
enforcement would have a detrimental impact on public safety by deterring
immigrants from cooperating with or seeking assistance from local law enforcement.
See Secret Immigration Enforcement Memo Exposed, ACLU (Sept. 7, 2005), https://www.
aclu.org/news/secret-immigration-enforcement-memo-exposed.
109
See Nat’l Immigration Forum, Immigration Law Enforcement by State
and Local Police 3 (Aug. 2007), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/EnforcementbyStateandLocalPolice-08-07.pdf; see also Nat’l
Immigration Law Ctr., Inclusive Policies Advance Dramatically in the States
14–15 (Oct. 2013), http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=963.
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claiming that state or local governments had acted in violation of §§ 1644
and 1373. In Lewis v. City of Kimball, a federal court in Nebraska considered the petitioner’s claim that her termination from her job as a police
officer in retaliation for her cooperation with federal immigration offi110
cials violated § 1373. Plaintiff did not allege that any defendant prohibited or restricted her from maintaining or exchanging relevant information in violation of § 1373. Instead she alleged that the defendants
violated § 1373 by terminating her after several local employers complained to city officials about enforcement actions conducted by ICE
against their employees in connection with investigations conducted by
111
plaintiff. That is, the city prohibited her from sharing immigrationrelated information in the course of her work as a police officer by firing
her. The district court dismissed the complaint, agreeing with defendants
that, even if plaintiff’s allegations were true, § 1373 did not provide her
with a remedy: “[T]he fact that a federal statute has been violated and
some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of
112
action in favor of that person.” The court found that § 1373 did not
expressly provide for a private right of action and that a private right of
action was not implicit in the statute. The court listed four factors traditionally considered by courts in determining whether a statute implies a
private right of action:
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,”—that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?113

Noting that these four factors were not entitled to equal weight in
the calculation, and that the critical determination was whether Congress
114
intended to afford a private right of action, the court concluded that,
because § 1373 did not expressly provide for a private right of action and
the legislative history did not suggest in any way that Congress intended
115
to do so, a private right of action under § 1373 did not exist.
110
See Lewis v. City of Kimball, No. 4:06CV3084, 2006 WL 2375479, at *2 (D. Neb.
Aug. 14, 2006).
111
Id. at *1.
112
Id. at *5 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979)).
113
Id. (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688 n.9 (citations omitted)).
114
Id.
115
Id. (“In other words, even if it is consistent with the underlying purpose of
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In Doe v. New York City, the plaintiff sought damages in connection
with a rape and robbery on property owned and operated by the Metro116
politan Transit Authority. Among the suspects charged and ultimately
convicted of the crime were four unauthorized immigrants. The plaintiff
alleged that city officials were aware of homeless squatters, including her
attackers, who lived in an encampment near the railroad tracks where the
assault took place but had failed to report the presence of unauthorized
117
immigrants to federal immigration officials in violation of § 1373. She
also alleged that several of her undocumented immigrant attackers had
been previously arrested by New York City police but had been released
pursuant to the city’s sanctuary policy, amended after the Second Cir118
cuit’s decision in City of New York v. United States. The court dismissed
the complaint, finding that although § 1373 prohibited state and local
governments from placing restrictions on reporting immigration-related
information to federal immigration authorities, it did not impose an af119
firmative duty on them to make such reports. The court noted that
§ 1373 did not expressly provide for a private right of action and that a
private right of action could be implied “only when the plaintiff is one of
the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted and a right
of action would be clearly in furtherance of the legislative purpose,”
120
which the court found was “lacking here.”
In Bologna v. City and County of San Francisco, family members of three
men murdered by an unauthorized immigrant filed a claim seeking damages and alleging that the city’s sanctuary policy was the legal cause of the
121
deaths. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the suspected murderer
was a gang member and a drug trafficker known to and previously arrested by city authorities, but that he had never been reported to or turned
§ 1373 to imply a private remedy in this case, and even if the enforcement of § 1373 is
a matter of federal concern, those considerations would not outweigh the fact that
there is absolutely no reason to conclude that Congress intended to create a private
cause of action for violations of § 1373.”).
116
See Doe v. City of New York, 860 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842–43 (Sup. Ct. 2008). The
Metropolitan Transit Authority is a “public benefit corporation[] and by statute [is]
regarded as performing a governmental function in carrying out [its] corporate
purpose and exercising the powers granted by statute.” Id. at 844.
117
Id. at 842–43.
118
See Peggy O’Hare, Accused Killer Helped by HPD’s ‘Hands-off’ Proviso,
Hous. Chron. (Mar. 8, 2003), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/
article/Accused-killer-helped-by-HPD-s-hands-off-proviso-2099827.php (discussing the
circumstances giving rise to Doe).
119
Doe, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
120
Id. at 844–45 (citing Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d. 18, 20
(N.Y. 1989); CPC Int’l, Inc. v McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 1987);
Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner., 451 N.E.2d 459, 463 (N.Y. 1983)).
121
See Bologna v. City & County of San Francisco, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 409 (Ct.
App. 2011).
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over to immigration officials because of the sanctuary policy. According
to plaintiffs, the sanctuary policy caused the defendants to violate § 1373,
and that statutory violation was the basis for a finding of negligence per
122
se against the city. In dismissing plaintiffs’ claim, the court noted that
in order to succeed on a claim of negligence per se the plaintiffs must
show “that the harm allegedly caused is of the precise nature a statute was
123
designed to prevent.” The court found that plaintiffs had identified
nothing in the legislative history or the text of the statute to suggest that
124
Congress intended § 1373 to protect individuals from violent crime. As
a result, the court concluded plaintiffs’ tort claims could not be premised
on § 1373.
And in Johnson v. Hurtt, Joselyn Johnson, the widow of a slain Houston Police Officer and a Houston police officer herself, brought a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Houston Police Department’s
sanctuary policies restricted her “right” to communicate with federal
125
immigration officials in violation of §§ 1644 and 1373. Johnson claimed
that the anti-sanctuary statutes “confirm, if not create, a federal right on
the part of local government officials such as Sergeant Johnson to share
information with federal immigration officials without interference from
126
their employers.”
The district court disagreed, pointing out that
“§ 1983 only provides redress for a plaintiff who asserts ‘a violation of a
federal right, not merely a violation of federal law,’” and concluding that
neither § 1644 nor § 1373 reflect Congress’s clear and unambiguous in127
tent to benefit the plaintiff individually. First, the court noted that the
language of § 1644 speaks expressly about the exchange of information
between ICE and state or local government entities, with no mention
whatsoever of the application of the statute to individuals. Consequently,
the court found that § 1644 did not convey “the sort of ‘individual enti128
tlement’ that is enforceable under § 1983.” With respect to § 1373, the
court also found that Congress did not intend to “address[] any particular individual needs or concerns regarding information sharing,” but was
instead implementing a “nationwide system of voluntary information
122

Id. at 411.
Id. (citing Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 968 P.2d 522, 531 (Cal. 1998)).
124
Id. at 414.
125
Johnson v. Hurtt, 893 F. Supp. 2d 817, 822–24 (S.D. Tex. 2012). Mrs. Johnson
was represented in this case by Judicial Watch, Inc. See Tom Fitton, Judicial Watch Goes
to Court, Judicial Watch: Weekly Update (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.
judicialwatch.org/press-room/weekly-updates/39-judicial-watch-goes-court/.
126
Reply Brief of Appellant at 15–16, Johnson v. City of Houston, 444 F. App’x 26
(5th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-20743).
127
Johnson, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 837–38 (quoting Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d
475, 477 (5th Cir. 2001)).
128
Id. at 838 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002)).
123
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sharing” intended to assist federal immigration authorities with the en129
forcement of immigration laws. Thus the court dismissed plaintiff’s
claims related to the anti-sanctuary statutes, finding that they did not
130
confer any individual rights enforceable under § 1983.
2. Claims to Invalidate Sanctuary Policies Pursuant to §§ 1644 and 1373
In addition to claims for damages, there have been various attempts
to use the federal anti-sanctuary provisions to invalidate state and local
sanctuary policies, claiming that they are in conflict with or preempted by
131
§§ 1644 and 1373. In Fonseca v. Fong, a San Francisco resident and taxpayer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) was not complying with a state statute,
§ 11369 of the California Health and Safety Code, which requires local
law enforcement agencies to report certain individuals arrested for drugrelated crimes and believed to be aliens to federal immigration authori132
ties. Fonseca alleged that by “disregard[ing]” their obligations under
that state law, the SFPD’s policies and practices violated federal law, in133
cluding § 1373(a) and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Fonseca asserted that the official policy of SFPD for implementing
§ 11369 impermissibly restricted cooperation with federal immigration
134
authorities in violation of § 1373, and sought an order mandating
compliance with § 11369.
Fonseca was represented in this action by Judicial Watch, Inc., a
“conservative, non-partisan educational foundation” that engages in litigation related to immigration and other issues in order to hold federal,
135
state, and local government entities accountable. Judicial Watch has
identified “illegal immigration” as an area of focus for their litigation efforts, and has characterized their involvement in Fonseca and other immigration-related litigation as “[o]pposing state and local illegal alien sanctuary policies and extension of government benefits to aliens, and
defending states that enforce our laws from attacks by groups who prefer

129

Id. at 840.
Id.
131
84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 570–71 (Ct. App. 2008).
132
See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11369 (West 2015). The statute provides:
“Arrest of alien; notice to federal agency[.] When there is reason to believe that any
person arrested for a violation of [California controlled-substance law] may not be a
citizen of the United States, the arresting agency shall notify the appropriate agency
of the United States having charge of deportation matters.”.
133
Fonseca, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 572 & n.7, 575–76.
134
Id. at 572 n.7 (“As we understand appellant’s position it is that, as a practical
matter, SFPD’s official policy purporting to implement Section 11369 . . . actually
restricts compliance with [8 U.S.C. § 1373] by SFPD officers.”).
135
See About Judicial Watch, Judicial Watch (2015), http://www.judicialwatch.
org/about/.
130
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136

lawlessness.” By mandating compliance with § 11369, Judicial Watch
sought, through Fonseca v. Fong, to “strike[] at the heart of the sanctuary
137
movement for illegal aliens.”
In response to Fonseca’s petition, the City of San Francisco argued
that § 11369, because it “serves no purpose other than promoting and facilitating enforcement of immigration laws,” was an impermissible regula138
tion of immigration preempted by federal law. Alternatively, the City
claimed that they did in fact comply with § 11369 and that San Francis139
co’s City of Refuge Ordinance did permit the release of immigration140
related information in the circumstances required under § 11369. The
state court of appeal, without deciding whether the SFPD violated its obligations under either § 11369 or 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as plaintiffs alleged,
concluded only that § 11369 was not preempted by the Constitution or by
federal law. The court of appeal rejected the trial court’s finding that
§ 11369 was an impermissible regulation of immigration preempted per
141
se by the federal government’s exclusive power over immigration. Notably for purposes of this discussion, while the court rejected the City’s
preemption challenge to § 11369, it did not address the question of
136

See Amicus Briefs and Litigation, Judicial Watch (2015), http://www.
judicialwatch.org/amicus-briefs/. According to Judicial Watch, the challenge in
Fonseca v. Fong is part of their effort to fight “rampant law-breaking resulting from the
willful non-enforcement of laws, whether due to selective enforcement or
institutional failure. Open law-breaking harms the public and creates a culture of
lawlessness, which leads to increases in criminal conduct.” Id.
137
See Fonseca v. Fong (No. CPF-07-507227)—San Francisco Sanctuary Policy, Judicial
Watch (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/fonseca-v-fong-no-cpf07-507227-2/.
138
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondents’
Demurrer to Petition for Writ of Ordinary Mandamus at 11–12, Fonseca, 84 Cal. Rptr.
3d 567 (No. A120206). The City relied on the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court
in De Canas v. Bica, for determining whether a state statute related to immigration is
preempted. See id. at 7, 11 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). The De
Canas test provides: First, is the state statute an impermissible regulation of
immigration? Second, was the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to effect a
“complete ouster of state power” with respect to the subject matter which the statute
attempts to regulate? And third, does the state law conflict with or “stand[] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress?” If a state statute does not survive any of the three tests, it is preempted. See
Fonseca, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 575 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355, 357, 363).
139
S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12H (2015).
140
See Fonseca, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 572 n.8.
141
Id. at 584. Relying on the three-part preemption analysis established in De
Canas v. Bica, the court explained that “[f]or purposes of assessing whether Section
11369 is per se preempted, the salient factor . . . is that it does not require any state
actor to determine who is and who is not present in the United States unlawfully.” Id.
at 583.
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whether the City’s sanctuary policy or police department practices pursuant to that policy were invalidated by the federal anti-sanctuary statutes.
The Fonseca court merely concluded that a state law that requires city officials to report certain non-citizens arrested for drug-related crimes to
142
federal authorities was not preempted by § 1373. Despite the limited
scope of the court’s holding, the outcome in this case was touted as a victory by Judicial Watch:
As a result of the appellate ruling, San Francisco must now end its
sanctuary policy that protects aliens arrested for certain drug offenses from being reported to ICE.
....
. . . San Francisco and other sanctuary cities are not above the law.
This court ruling exposes the lie behind the argument that state
and local law enforcement cannot help enforce immigration laws.143

Judicial Watch’s predictions about the fate of San Francisco’s sanctuary policy were overstated, however, and in 2015 the policy challenged in
144
Fonseca is still largely in place.
145
In Sturgeon v. Bratton, another anti-sanctuary lawsuit initiated by Judicial Watch, Harold Sturgeon, a resident of Los Angeles, brought a challenge in California state court to the validity of Special Order 40 (SO40),
a policy of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) which reads:
Enforcement of United States Immigration Laws. Officers shall not
initiate police action where the objective is to discover the alien status of a person. Officers shall neither arrest nor book persons for
violation of Title 8, Section 1325 of the United States Immigration
Code (Illegal Entry).146

SO40 was adopted in 1979 and represented a significant reversal in
LAPD practice and policy regarding unauthorized immigrants. Where
previously LAPD officers were encouraged and in some cases mandated
to obtain and report immigration-related information about individuals
suspected of being unauthorized immigrants, SO40 prohibited officers
from engaging with members of the community for the sole purpose of
147
uncovering civil immigration violations. As compared to the Executive
142

Id. at 583–84.
California Appellate Court Rules Against San Francisco Sanctuary Policy, Judicial
Watch (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/
california-appeals-court-rules-against-san-francisco-sanctuary-policy/.
144
See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code §§ 12H, 12I.
145
95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2009).
146
Id. at 722, 724–25. SO40 and other Special Orders are directives issued by the
Police Chief which amend the LAPD Manual. SO40 is incorporated into the Manual
at Volume IV, § 264.50.
147
Rampart Indep. Review Panel, A Report to the Los Angeles Board of
143

LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete)

2016]

FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW

5/24/2016 4:23 PM

197

Order at issue in New York v. United States, a “don’t tell” policy that prohibited sharing immigration-related information with federal immigra148
tion authorities, SO40 has been characterized as a “don’t ask” policy.
Sturgeon sought an injunction against the enforcement of SO40 as
149
an illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds. Sturgeon alleged that SO40
violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it was in
direct conflict with § 1373. He also argued that, even absent an unconstitutional conflict with § 1373, SO40 was preempted by federal immigration law because it was an improper “regulation of immigration” and
150
stood as an obstacle to Congress’s intentions in enacting § 1373. The
court of appeal concluded that Sturgeon had brought a facial challenge
to SO40 since he had not offered evidence of any specific applications of
151
SO40 resulting in a violation of § 1373. After reviewing the text of SO40
and § 1373, the court found that there was “no total and fatal conflict”
152
between them. Specifically, the court found no conflict because SO40
said nothing about communication with ICE, the only topic addressed by
§ 1373, and § 1373 said nothing about initiation of police action or ar153
rests for illegal entry, the only topics addressed by SO40. The court similarly found that SO40 did not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s purposes and objective in enacting § 1373. While leaving open the possibility
that SO40 could be interpreted or applied in a way that conflicted with
§ 1373, the court found that SO40 was not preempted because by its
terms it had “no effect on the voluntary flow of immigration information
154
between LAPD officers and ICE.”
Police Commissioners Concerning Special Order 40, at 1 (Feb. 1, 2001), http://
assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/report_rampart_special_order_40.pdf.
148
Hing, supra note 12, at 259–60.
149
Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722. Harold Sturgeon has been the named
plaintiff in at least two other lawsuits brought by Judicial Watch, Inc. See Sturgeon v.
County of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Ct. App. 2010); Sturgeon v. County of
Los Angeles, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Ct. App. 2008).
150
Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732. Plaintiff also alleged that SO40 was invalid
because it violated § 834b of the California Penal Code, a provision that imposes
certain requirements on all state law enforcement agencies relating to obtaining and
reporting immigration-related information to federal immigration authorities. The
court dismissed this claim based on a prior federal court ruling that § 834b was
preempted as an impermissible regulation of immigration law. See id. at 733–34.
151
Id. at 730.
152
Id. at 731–32.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 732–33; see also Moreno v. Bratton, No. B214390, 2010 WL 161503, at *2
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting Judicial Watch challenge to LAPD sanctuary policy in
the context of compliance with § 11369 of the California Health and Safety Code
requiring reporting of persons arrested for certain drug-related crimes to
immigration authorities); Steven M. Ellis, Court Rejects Challenge to LAPD Immigration
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While the controversy over states, cities, and law enforcement agencies adopting policies or practices that limit their involvement with federal immigration enforcement continues to rage almost twenty years after
§§ 1644 and 1373 became law, the federal anti-sanctuary provisions have
been largely ineffective in putting a stop to sanctuary laws and policies. In
addition, the legal challenges to sanctuary laws based on §§ 1644 and
1373 have not resulted in the expansive interpretations of the statutes
that the plaintiffs and opponents of sanctuary laws in general were hoping for. Indeed, as discussed above, the litigation has brought clarity on
how very limited the application of the statutes is, providing guidance to
states and cities as they moved forward with drafting their own sanctuary
provisions. As weapons against sub-federal sanctuary measures, §§ 1644
and 1373 have proven much less than lethal.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY
PROVISIONS AND OTHER FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS
Much of the debate and virtually all of the litigation surrounding
§§ 1644 and 1373 has centered on how these provisions impact the ability
of state and local law enforcement agencies and officers to implement
practices that protect from disclosure the immigration status of individuals they come in contact with in the course of their professional duties.
And there is little doubt that the 1996 laws were passed in substantial part
to respond specifically to measures implemented by or directed at local
law enforcement agencies that attempted to limit immigration information sharing between state and local police and federal immigration
officials. Nevertheless, government agencies and officials outside of law
enforcement arguably come in even more frequent contact with unauthorized immigrant residents and have access to personal information
about them. In particular, officials and employees of public schools and
public health care systems have frequent interactions with and access to
personal, identifying information about unauthorized immigrants residing in a community. And like law enforcement agencies, they would fall
within the ambit of §§ 1644 and 1373, and so be prohibited from adopting policies or practices that restrict the sharing of immigration-related
information with federal immigration authorities. If this is true, a registrar at a local elementary school could not be prohibited from contacting
ICE to provide the names and addresses of students and their families
that she believed were in the United States in violation of immigration
law. Similarly, a records clerk at a public hospital emergency room could
call ICE to provide the names and addresses of emergency room patients,
who because they spoke Spanish and had no medical insurance, he susPolicy, L.A. Cmty Policing (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.lacp.org/2010-Articles-Main/
012110-CourtRejectsChallengeToLAPDImmigrationPolicy.htm.
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pected were unauthorized immigrants. The impact of such disclosures
would be devastating to the individuals involved and have a chilling effect
on the willingness of other unauthorized immigrants to send their children to school or to seek medical treatment. Indeed, in at least one state
that passed a state anti-sanctuary bill that mirrored § 1373, there was an
immediate drop in attendance in public schools serving the immigrant
155
communities in that state, and a child’s death was reported when his
parents delayed seeking medical treatment because they feared that hos156
pital officials would report them to ICE. In addition, public health officials have expressed grave concerns that state immigration enforcement
initiatives, including anti-sanctuary measures, will impede the management of communicable disease treatment if unauthorized immigrants
avoid diagnosis or treatment out of fear of reporting by health care pro157
viders to federal immigration officials.
Part of the message implicit in §§ 1644 and 1373, as well as in copycat state measures, is that any public employee who acquires personal information about an unauthorized immigrant in the course of his or her
official duties is free to contact ICE to report a suspected immigration violation and that no government agency or official may do anything to
prevent that. The power in that message is real and gives license to those
who might want to report and anxiety to those who fear being reported.
Nor are concerns about personal information gathered by state agencies

155

Campbell Robertson, After Ruling, Hispanics Flee an Alabama Town, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 2011, at A1. Two days after a federal judge upheld Alabama’s H.B. 56, nearly
2,000 Hispanic children across the state were absent from school.
156
Justin Juozapavicius, Okla. Immigration Law Blamed for Death, Fox News
(Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Jan25/0,4675,
ImmigrationCrackdownOklahoma,00.html. Edgar Castorena, a two-month-old child,
died of a ruptured intestine in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in July 2007. Though he had
suffered for more than a week with diarrhea, his parents, both unauthorized
immigrants, were afraid to take him to a hospital out of concern that a recently
passed state law that permitted and encouraged public employees to share
immigration status information with federal immigration officials would lead to their
deportation. The Oklahoma law, H.B. 1804, included a provision that prohibited
state and local government agencies and officials from restricting government
employees from communicating or cooperating with federal immigration authorities.
157
Am. Coll. of Physicians, State Immigration Initiatives Affecting Access
to Health Care, https://www.acponline.org/advocacy/state_health_policy/
otherissuesofinterest/state_immigration_innitiatives.pdf (“[P]rospective patients may
not seek needed medical care for fear of being reported to immigration authorities
which could, in turn, endanger the public health.”); see also Sonal S. Munsiff,
Communicable Disease and Immigration Fears, 9 Virtual Mentor: AMA J. Ethics 799,
803 (2007) (“Patients who fear and avoid treatment could infect many more people;
it is in all of society’s interest to ensure that all patients with TB are fully and
confidentially treated.”).
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being shared with immigration enforcement officials unfounded. In Salt
Lake City, Utah, as lawmakers there began to draft a bill modeled after
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a group calling itself Concerned Citizens of the
United States released a list entitled “Illegal Immigrants” that included
personal information about 1300 people, including names, addresses,
158
dates of birth, and other information. The list was sent to news media
and law enforcement agencies accompanied by a letter urging the publication of the list and the immediate deportation of every person on the
159
list. The release of the list caused panic in the immigrant community,
especially because the list was not published anywhere so there was anxiety about who was on the list and what action might be taken against
160
them. One representative of a local advocacy organization called it a
161
“witch hunt.” An investigation discovered that at least two employees
from the State Workforce Services office were involved, and the Governor’s Office issued a statement acknowledging that the release of this information could be a violation of both state and federal law, including
162
“federal medical privacy laws,” and could lead to criminal prosecutions.
Among the information collected by the Workforce Services Office is information in connection with applications for food stamps and Medicaid,
including due date information about pregnant women seeking prenatal
163
health services. State officials referred to the employees involved as
rogue employees, disgruntled around some issues related to immigra164
tion, but this incident exemplifies the unfettered voluntary information-sharing that the federal anti-sanctuary statutes are intended to
both encourage and provoke. While in this case both the scope of the information released and the recipients of that information went beyond
the disclosures protected under §§ 1644 and 1373, the anti-sanctuary
provisions are clearly intended to prevent states and localities from putting up any obstacles to immigration-related information sharing by public employees, even when that information may otherwise be protected by
federal law. Notably, although both employees in this case lost their jobs
and were eventually convicted of state crimes, neither was charged with a

158
Kirk Johnson, ‘Immigrant’ List in Utah Reveals Private Data and Sets Off Fears, N.Y.
Times, July 15, 2010, at A1.
159
Id.
160
Id. at A3.
161
David Wright et al., Leaking of List of Illegal Immigrants in Utah Terrifies Latino
Community, ABC News (July 15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/leaking-list-1300purported-illegal-immigrants-living-utah/story?id=11166203&singlePage=true.
162
Johnson, supra note 158, at A3.
163
Id.
164
Brock Vergakis, Utah Illegal Immigrants List Leakers Identified, Huffington Post
(May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/16/utah-illegal-immigrants-

l_n_649625.html.
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165

violation of a federal privacy law. However, assuming the information
released was in fact protected by federal medical privacy laws, it is far
from clear that §§ 1644 and 1373 would have protected these employees
from prosecution under federal law, even for the limited release to federal immigration authorities specifically permitted by these provisions.
Sections 1644 and 1373 both prohibit state or local government restrictions on the communication of immigration status information between federal and state or local entities “[n]otwithstanding any other
166
provision of Federal, State, or local law.” In the context of educational
and health records in particular, this calls into question whether and how
other federal laws protecting the privacy of these records may operate to
prevent disclosures of immigration status information that falls within the
scope of protected health and educational records. Is a public official or
employee with access to protected health, educational or other records
prohibited from disclosing that information to federal immigration authorities? Do the federal anti-sanctuary provisions supersede or repeal
conflicting federal laws that would restrict sharing immigration status information with federal immigration authorities?
A. Sections 1644 and 1373 Do Not Repeal Existing Privacy Protections in
Federal Law
When the federal anti-sanctuary provisions became law in 1996,
there were federal laws in place that prohibited disclosure of information
167
168
169
from tax records, educational records, health records, driver’s li170
171
cense records and census records. Despite the fact that §§ 1644 and
1373 each contain the prefatory phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other
165
Nate Carlisle, Probation for Former Utah Employees Who Made ‘the List,’ Salt Lake
Trib. (June 7, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/51952737-78/carson-bassettreed-list.html.csp (“Carson pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and was given 12 months
of probation and a $440 fine. Bassett . . . maintained her innocence but
acknowledged prosecutors had enough evidence to convict her of two felonies. A
judge sentenced Bassett to 36 months of probation and 250 hours of community
service.”).
166
8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012); id. § 1373.
167
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 1202, 90 Stat. 1520, 1667
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)).
168
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513,
88 Stat. 484, 571 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g).
169
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 262, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6).
170
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721(a)).
171
Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 740, 68 Stat. 1012, 1013–14 (codified as
amended at 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)).
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provisions of Federal, state or local law,” a fair reading of the text and
history of the statutes suggests that the anti-sanctuary provisions were not
intended to and do not repeal conflicting privacy protections in federal
law.
First, the text of the statutes does not suggest that Congress intended
to repeal any particular federal privacy protection or federal privacy protections in general. It is beyond doubt that Congress was aware in 1996
that there existed a number of federal laws that placed restrictions on
disclosure of certain categories of protected information. Federal protections for taxpayer information and educational records had been in place
for decades, and a federal law prohibiting release of driver’s license information had been implemented just two years prior. Indeed, in the
same session of Congress in which §§ 1644 and 1373 were enacted, Congress considered and adopted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which included prohibitions on disclosure of
172
protected health information. Had Congress wanted to repeal these existing protections, §§ 1644 and 1373 could have been drafted in a man173
ner which would have left no ambiguity about their intent. “[I]t is ‘[a]
long-standing maxim of statutory construction that statutes are enacted
in accord with the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes, and
therefore statutes dealing with the same subject should be construed to174
gether.’” In the absence of a clear expression of an intent to repeal,
then, the anti-sanctuary provisions must be read in a way that will allow
175
them to be reconciled with existing privacy protections. To do otherwise is to assume that Congress intended to roll back long-standing privacy protections, a conclusion that seems especially unlikely given the
number of existing federal laws likely to be impacted and absent clear
language to that effect in the statutes.

172

HIPAA § 262 was enacted on August 21, 1996, one day before PRWORA.
See Relationship Between Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 and Statutory Requirement for Confidentiality of Census
Information, 23 Op. O.L.C. Supp., at 5 (1999) [hereinafter IIRIRA Opinion Letter],
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/10/
1999-05-18-census-confidentiality.pdf.
174
Id. (quoting Memorandum for Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Att’y Gen. for
Admin., from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re:
Establishing a Maximum Entry Age Limit for Law Enforcement Officer Positions in the
Department of Justice, at 3 (Apr. 3, 1975)).
175
Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (citing United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)) (“The courts are not at liberty to pick and
choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. ‘When there are two acts upon
the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible . . . . The intention of the
legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.’”).
173

LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete)

2016]

FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW

5/24/2016 4:23 PM

203

In 1999, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
was asked to consider the relationship between § 1373 and a federal stat176
ute barring disclosure of census-related information. In that opinion,
the OLC concluded that § 1373 did not act to repeal the census privacy
law. Though the OLC opinion focused specifically on the interaction between § 1373 and the census-privacy protections, the analysis and conclusions apply as well to the interaction of the federal anti-sanctuary statutes
and other privacy protections in federal law. The OLC considered first
whether the prohibition in § 1373 on federal, state, or local-government
entities and officials was meant to include the “United States Congress
177
acting pursuant to its lawmaking authority.” Such an interpretation, the
OLC concluded, would “be at odds” with the principle that Congress
“may not, by statute, direct the Congress not to enact certain laws in the
178
future.” Since Congress lacks the authority “to command itself by statute not to enact a law in the future,” the OLC concluded that “it would
be odd to construe the command contained in § 1373 to have been intended to apply to Congress’s own power to enact prohibitions or re179
strictions on disclosure.” The only way to avoid that odd outcome
would be to interpret § 1373 to apply only retroactively to federal statutes.
The OLC, however, concluded that there was no basis for construing
§ 1373 to apply both prospectively and retroactively to state and local laws
but only retroactively to federal statutes. The interpretive “oddities”
could be avoided, according to OLC, if the text of § 1373 was interpreted
instead to “apply only to disclosure prohibitions or restrictions other than
180
those imposed by federal statute.” Interpreting § 1373 to invalidate
conflicting state and local non-disclosure law is consistent with the requirement that sub-federal governments can only legislate in the immigration area in accord with federal law. Similarly, § 1373 could be “comfortably construed to limit the discretionary authority of federal officers,
or employees, or . . . agencies”—but not Congress—to adopt prohibitions
on disclosure, since such discretionary authority may generally only be
181
exercised to the extent permitted by statute.

176
See IIRIRA Opinion Letter, supra note 173 (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) and 13
U.S.C. § 9(a)).
177
Id. at 6.
178
Id. (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810)) (“The
principle asserted is that one legislature . . . cannot abridge the powers of a
succeeding legislature. The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general
legislation, can never be controverted.”).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 6–7.
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While the OLC acknowledged that the prefatory language “‘notwithstanding any other provisions of Federal, State, or local law’ does reflect a
congressional intent to displace inconsistent law,” it concluded that absent any other indication of Congress’s intent to repeal, this language did
not “support a broad construction of the substantive provision that would
182
give rise to such inconsistencies.” The fact that a statute provides that it
is effective notwithstanding any other provision of law “does not evidence
183
an express repeal” of the statute. This is especially true when the potential repealer does not identify in any way the statute or statutes that might
be affected, but instead is a general repealing clause that has the poten184
tial to affect a number of inconsistent enactments. Under these circumstances, the OLC suggested that with respect to federal law, the “notwithstanding” phrase of § 1373 can only be reasonably interpreted to mean
that federal officials or entities may not “exercise their general administrative discretion in a manner that would prohibit or restrict disclosures”
185
of immigration-related information covered by § 1373. “The phrase
should not be understood to refer, therefore, to federal statutes that
186
themselves prohibit or restrict such disclosures.”
The OLC also considered the “important governmental interests that
first prompted the enactment of a statutory requirement of confidentiality” for census information. Confidentiality encourages the public to cooperate with census officials by “giv[ing] effective assurance to all persons
. . . that the identity of the informant and the information furnished
187
would be held in complete confidence.” Together with the fact that the
census privacy law had been amended subsequent to the adoption of
§ 1373 to add two specific exceptions to the confidentiality requirement
188
and had not specifically mentioned the interplay with § 1373, the OLC
concluded that “[i]t is unlikely that . . . Congress would have adopted
such a significant limitation on the scope of the census confidentiality
requirement without either referring to it expressly” in § 1373 or an

182

Id. at 6.
Moyle v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 147 F.3d 1116, 1119 n.4
(9th Cir. 1998) (citing In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 582 (9th Cir. 1991)).
184
See Moyle, 147 F.3d at 1119 n.4 (quoting 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 23.08 (5th ed. 1993) (“An express general repealing
clause to the effect that all inconsistent enactments are repealed, should legally be a
nullity.”)).
185
IIRIRA Opinion Letter, supra note 173, at 7.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 10 (quoting Seventeenth Decennial Census, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 120, 124
(1953)) (citing Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 356–62 (1982) (concluding that in
enacting the Freedom of Information Act, and in giving courts authority to discover
non-privileged information, Congress could not have intended to override the census
privacy protections)).
188
Id. at 8.
183
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amendment to the census privacy provision, or “at the least, using more
189
direct language than it has employed here.”
Finally, the OLC looked to the legislative history for any indication
that Congress intended to repeal federal statutory restrictions on disclosure of confidential information. Here, too, the OLC concluded that the
legislative history reveals no such intent, pointing out that the House
conference report refers only to the impact of § 1373 on state or local en190
tities and that the Senate report suggests that Congress was primarily
concerned with state and local restrictions, not federal statutory re191
strictions. Since the OLC opinion was limited to a discussion of § 1373,
it did not consider the reference to FERPA in the House Conference Report to § 1644, but that reference similarly contains no clear expression
of a congressional intent to repeal the privacy protections in FERPA or
any other federal privacy provisions:
The confidentiality provisions of various State statutes may prohibit
disclosure of immigration status obtained under them. Some Federal laws, including the Family Education Rights and Protection
Act, may deny funds to certain State and local agencies that disclose
a protected individual’s immigration status. Various localities have
enacted laws preventing local officials from disclosing the immigration status of individuals to INS.192

At most, this language suggests that Congress may have been aware
of certain state and local laws prohibiting disclosure of immigrationrelated information and that some Federal laws, including FERPA, may
deny funds to states that make unauthorized disclosures of immigrationrelated information. Nothing here suggests that Congress intended to
supersede the disclosure protections in FERPA. In fact, this language
might more appropriately be read as an expression of Congress’s intent
to invalidate the state and local measures, but leave intact the privacy

189

Id. at 11.
See id. at 11–12 (“[Section 1373] provides that notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal, State or local law, no State or local government entity shall prohibit
or in any way restrict any government entity or official from sending to or receiving
from the INS information regarding the immigration status of any individual in the
United States.” (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 249 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.))).
191
See id. at 11 (“Effective immigration law enforcement requires a cooperative
effort between all levels of government. The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange
of immigration-related information by State and local agencies is consistent with, and
potentially of considerable assistance to, the Federal regulation of immigration and
the achieving of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”
(quoting S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996))).
192
H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 391 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
190
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protections provided under FERPA and the other federal laws referenced.
The OLC’s analysis and conclusions with respect to § 1373 and the
federal census privacy protections suggest that the federal anti-sanctuary
provisions do not and were not intended to repeal any other existing privacy protections in federal law. Neither the text nor the legislative history
of §§ 1644 or 1373 reveals an intent by Congress to repeal existing federal privacy laws. Additionally, given the important governmental interest
in protecting confidential educational, health, driver’s license, and tax
193
information, and the impact that a repeal of these provisions would
have on those interests, it is inconceivable that Congress could have intended such a result. Indeed, as discussed below, the federal government
has made it quite clear that FERPA’s privacy protections apply with equal
force to immigration-related information in education records, and that
failing to comply with such protections is both illegal and unconstitutional.
B. FERPA and Disclosure of Educational Records to Immigration Authorities
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA)
generally prohibits school officials and employees from disclosing educa194
tion records without the prior written consent of the parent. FERPA defines education records to include “records, files, documents, and other
materials which—(i) contain information directly related to a student;
and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a
195
person acting for such agency or institution.” Certain information is
specifically excluded from the definition of educational records, including “records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational
agency . . . that were created by that law enforcement unit for the pur196
pose of law enforcement.” Additionally, there are exceptions under
193

See, e.g., Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and
Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133, 148–49 (2004) (stating that
due to “increased electronic transmission of health information” under HIPAA,
Congress “recogniz[ed] the concomitant need to guarantee certain protections to
patients’ privacy”); Dixie Snow Huefner & Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA Update: Balancing
Access to and Privacy of Student Records, 152 Ed. L. Rep. 469, 469 (2001) (noting that
FERPA was enacted at a time when “[p]rivacy was a growing concern”); Stephen W.
Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1065, 1070–71 (2003)
(citing government studies that linked confidentially to an increase in taxpayer
cooperation).
194
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a) (2015). FERPA applies to all
schools, public and private, that receive funds under an applicable program of the
U.S. Department of Education. Id.
195
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
196
Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii). The definition of law enforcement records limits the
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which disclosure of otherwise protected educational records may be
197
made without prior parental consent, but reporting immigration status
or any other information to a federal immigration agency or even to local
law enforcement is not among the exceptions. Moreover, re-disclosure of
information by the individual or agency receiving information from a
198
school under one of these exceptions is also strictly proscribed. Schools
may also disclose, without consent, “directory” information including a
student’s name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth,
199
honors and awards, and dates of attendance. However, schools must
tell parents and eligible students about directory information and allow
parents and eligible students a reasonable amount of time to request that
200
the school not disclose directory information about them. Generally,
directory information is information that would not be considered harm201
ful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed. In the context of immigration
enforcement, place of birth could very well be among the “directory” information that an immigrant family would not want disclosed, since a
birthplace outside of the United States could raise questions about citizenship or immigration status. However, even the disclosure of such “directory” information requires advance notification to parents and an op202
portunity to object to release of that information.
The collection and dissemination of student personal information
and education records has been a source of debate and confusion among
educators, parents, and lawmakers since the 1982 Supreme Court ruling

scope of information that falls into this exception: “Education records, and personally
identifiable information contained in education records, do not lose their status as
education records and remain subject to the Act, including the disclosure provisions
of § 99.30, while in the possession of the law enforcement unit.” 34 C.F.R.
§ 99.8(c)(2).
197
See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31; Family Policy Compliance Office, Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. Dep’t of Educ., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/
gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html (listing exceptions allowing disclosure of records
“to the following parties or under the following conditions . . . : School officials with
legitimate educational interest; [o]ther schools to which a student is transferring;
[s]pecified officials for audit or evaluation purposes; [a]ppropriate parties in
connection with financial aid to a student; [o]rganizations conducting certain studies
for or on behalf of the school; [a]ccrediting organizations; [t]o comply with a judicial
order or lawfully issued subpoena; [a]ppropriate officials in cases of health and safety
emergencies; and [s]tate and local authorities, within a juvenile justice system,
pursuant to specific State law”).
198
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 99.33.
199
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
See 34 C.F.R. § 99.37.
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203

in Plyler v. Doe. Plyler overturned a 1975 Texas statute that authorized
Texas school districts to deny enrollment to unauthorized immigrant
children and withheld state funding for their education. In declaring the
Texas law unconstitutional, Plyler held that unauthorized-immigrant children must have the same access to public primary and secondary education as U.S.-citizen children and cannot be denied access to enrollment
204
based solely on their immigration status. Denying unauthorized immigrant children access to public education, the Court held, was a violation
of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Con205
stitution.
In the more than two decades since the Plyler decision, numerous at206
tempts have been made to overturn or circumvent Plyler. Notable for
the purposes of this article have been efforts by school districts and some
state legislatures to require certain forms of identification or proof of residence for all children enrolling in public school. Typically, the documentation or information required has included documents or information that an unauthorized immigrant child would be unable to
provide, including social security numbers, driver’s licenses, green cards,
207
or visas. Students unable to produce the documents are unable to enroll and others, aware of the documentation requirement are discouraged from attempting to enroll, and both are ultimately denied access to
208
free public education in violation of Plyler. In response to reports that
203

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 230.
205
Id. at 210–213.
206
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1249
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (overturning Proposition 187, a referendum that would have
banned enrollment in California public schools by unauthorized immigrant children
and required authorities to report the children’s unauthorized—or apparently
unauthorized—parents or guardians). In another unsuccessful attempt to reverse
Plyler, California representative Elton Gallegly proposed an amendment to an
immigration bill that would permit the states to deny unauthorized alien children
free K-12 public education, as California had sought to do with Proposition 187, or to
charge those students tuition for public school enrollment, as Texas had done
before. See H.R. 4134, 104th Cong. (1996); Marc Lacey et al., Gallegly Brings Proposition
187-Style Tug-of-War to Congress, L.A. Times (Apr. 12, 1996), http://articles.
latimes.com/1996-04-12/local/me-57668_1_elton-gallegly. The Gallegly amendment
failed.
207
See Udi Ofer, Protecting Plyler: New Challenges to the Right of Immigrant Children to
Access a Public School Education, 1 Colum. J. Race & L. 187, 204–09 (2012).
208
Id.; see Julia Preston, Districts Told Not to Deny Students Over Immigration, N.Y.
Times (May 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/us/districts-are-warnednot-to-deny-students-over-immigration-status.html. The Department of Justice entered
into formal settlements with two counties in Georgia and Florida, which at the time
were engaging in practices that prevented undocumented students from enrolling.
See Agreement Between the United States of America and Henry County
School District (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
204
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many school districts engaged in practices that discouraged enrollment
by unauthorized immigrant children, the U.S. Departments of Justice
and Education recently issued an amended guidance detailing the types
of documentation that can legally be required for enrollment in public
209
schools. That guidance reminded state and local education agencies of
their obligation under federal law to provide all children with equal access to primary and secondary education and “encourage[d] states and
districts to proactively implement supportive enrollment policies and
practices that create a welcoming and inclusive environment for all stu210
dents.” Further, it specifically advised that schools may not inquire
about a student’s or parent’s citizenship or immigration status as proof of
residency; refuse to enroll a student who does not provide a social security number or request a social security number from a parent; or prevent
or discourage a child from enrolling because he does not have a birth
211
certificate or has a foreign birth certificate. Significantly, it also noted
that FERPA controls the circumstances under which a school district,
once it has acquired personal information about a student, may disclose
information from that student’s education records without the consent of
212
a parent. The guidance confirmed that these circumstances are “limited and unlikely to be applicable in the majority of situations school dis213
tricts confront.” There is no mention in the guidance of federal antisanctuary provisions providing a mechanism for disclosure of immigration-status information from educational records contrary to FERPA’s
protections. Rather, as noted above, the guidance makes clear that school
districts are not to concern themselves with the immigration status of
456201211914625474963.pdf. Additionally, following a lawsuit brought by the ACLU,
a New Jersey school district stopped a practice that required parents to present stateissued identification cards that undocumented immigrants could not obtain. Id. A
survey showed that at least 187 New Jersey school districts were illegally requesting
Social Security numbers during enrollment. See 1 in 5 NJ Schools Puts Up Barriers for
Immigrant Children, ACLU N.J. (Sept. 2, 2008), https://www.aclu-nj.org/news/2008/
09/02/1-in-5-nj-schools-puts-up-barriers-for-immigrant-children/.
209
See Preston, supra note 208; see Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon et al., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May. 8, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201405.pdf; Fact Sheet: Information on the Rights
of All Children to Enroll in School, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/plylerfact.pdf; Information on the
Rights of All Children to Enroll in School: Questions and Answers for States, School
Districts and Parents, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 8, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/plylerqa.pdf [hereinafter Questions
and Answers].
210
Questions and Answers, supra note 209, at 1.
211
Id. at 3–5.
212
Id. at 5.
213
Id.
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their students and should take steps to ensure that they do not act in a
way that would discourage or prevent any child from enrolling in school.
In addition to unlawful documentation requirements, there have also been state measures that require public schools to collect information
about the immigration status of students and their parents in a purported
attempt to track the number of unauthorized immigrant children en214
rolled. These measures not only mandate collection of information
about immigration status, they also require the state Department of Education to report to the legislature the costs associated with educating unauthorized immigrant children, presumably with a goal of proving that
providing this education substantially impacts the state education budget
and, as a result, the quality of education in the state overall. In Plyler, the
Supreme Court rejected Texas’s claim that the cost of educating unauthorized immigrant children detracted from the overall quality of education available to students in the state, finding that “[t]he record in no
way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is likely
215
to improve the overall quality of education in the State.” These more
recent data-gathering provisions are likely intended by the states to arm
themselves with evidence found lacking in Plyler and, ultimately, to pave
216
the way for an end to Plyler. But whether or not that happens, these
state measures, which require school districts to gather immigration status information from all enrolling students, prompt a more careful look
at the interplay between the federal anti-sanctuary statutes and FERPA.
The Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act
(H.B. 56) provides an opportunity to do just that. H.B. 56 was enacted in
June 2011. It is, like Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a comprehensive bill with provisions requiring immigration status checks at police stops, criminalizing
failure to carry immigration documents, prohibiting employment by unauthorized migrants, and requiring schools to verify the immigration sta-

214

See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (LexisNexis 2011), invalidated by Hispanic Interest
Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Ofer, supra
note 207, at 218–22.
215
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982).
216
See id. (“As the District Court . . . noted, the State failed to offer any ‘credible
supporting evidence that a proportionately small diminution of the funds spent on
each child [which might result from devoting some state funds to the education of
the excluded group] will have a grave impact on the quality of education.’ And, after
reviewing the State’s school financing mechanism, the District Court . . . concluded
that barring undocumented children from local schools would not necessarily
improve the quality of education provided in those schools. Of course, even if
improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number
of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this
group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need,
however, undocumented children are ‘basically indistinguishable’ from legally
resident alien children.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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217

tus of all students enrolling. The law was immediately challenged by the
218
U.S. Department of Justice and a coalition of human rights groups. By
August 2012, many of the law’s provisions had been blocked by federal
courts, including § 28, the provision requiring immigration status checks
219
and information gathering for public-school students. Section 28 requires public elementary and secondary schools in the state to determine
if the child “was born outside the . . . United States” or is the child of an
220
unauthorized immigrant parent. This determination is made by exam221
ining the child’s birth certificate. If the birth certificate reveals “that
the student was born outside the . . . United States or is the child of an
alien not lawfully present in the United States,” or if no birth certificate is
available, then the child’s guardian must notify the school of the child’s
222
actual citizenship or immigration status within 30 days. The statute
specifies that this notification shall be either official documentation of
the student’s U.S. citizenship or legal immigration status or a sworn declaration of the parent confirming the U.S. citizenship or legal immigra223
tion status of the child. If no such notification is provided the school

217

See Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala.
Laws 888 (codified as amended at Ala. Code § 31-13-1 to -13-35); see also S.B. 1070,
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
218
See Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236, 1240
(11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2012).
219
See Hispanic Interest Coal., 691 F.3d at 1241.
220
Ala. Code § 31-13-27(a)(1) (“Every public elementary and secondary school
in this state, at the time of enrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school,
shall determine whether the student enrolling in public school was born outside the
jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the
United States and qualifies for assignment to an English as Second Language class or
other remedial program.”).
221
Id. § 31-13-27(a)(2) (“The public school, when making the determination
required by subdivision (1), shall rely upon presentation of the student’s original
birth certificate, or a certified copy thereof.”).
222
Id. § 31-13-27(a)(3) (“If, upon review of the student’s birth certificate, it is
determined that the student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or
is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States, or where such
certificate is not available for any reason, the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of
the student shall notify the school within 30 days of the date of the student’s
enrollment of the actual citizenship or immigration status of the student under
federal law.”).
223
Id. § 31-13-27(a)(4) (“Notification shall consist of both of the following: a.
The presentation for inspection to a school official . . . of official documentation
establishing the citizenship and, in the case of an alien, the immigration status of the
student, or alternatively by submission of a notarized copy of such documentation to
such official[; and] b. Attestation by the parent, guardian, or legal custodian, under
penalty of perjury, that the document states the true identity of the child. If the
student or his or her parent, guardian, or legal representative possesses no such
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shall presume and report that the student is not lawfully present in the
224
United States. The statute further states that “[p]ublic disclosure by any
person of information obtained pursuant to this section which personally
identifies any student shall be unlawful, except for purposes permitted
225
pursuant to 8 [U.S.C. §§] 1644 and 1373.” In other words, no student
information gathered as a part of this enrollment process shall be disclosed except for immigration status information, which can be shared
with federal immigration enforcement pursuant to federal anti-sanctuary
provisions.
In Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Alabama, and in United States v. Alabama, the companion case filed by the United States against Alabama, the
226
Eleventh Circuit approved an equal protection challenge to § 28. Despite the fact that the provision treats every child enrolling in Alabama
schools the same by requiring the presentation of a birth certificate, the
court found that the statute had a special impact on unauthorized immigrant children because it required them to disclose their immigration
status as a condition of enrollment. Indeed, the court found that even
though all students were required to show birth certificates, the purpose
of the provision was to “force[] unlawfully present aliens to divulge their
unlawful status,” either by “admit[ting their] unlawful status outright or
227
conced[ing] it through silence.” As a result, the court found that the
children were exposed to criminal prosecution, deportation, harassment
228
and intimidation. “We are of the mind that an increased likelihood of
deportation or harassment upon enrollment in school significantly deters
undocumented children from enrolling in and attending school, in con229
travention of their rights under Plyler.”
Significantly, the court found that the adverse immigration consequences inflicted on unauthorized-immigrant students by § 28 of H.B. 56
were the direct result of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373. The court dismissed
as ineffectual the language in § 28 limiting disclosure of student infor-

documentation but nevertheless maintains that the student is either a United States
citizen or an alien lawfully present in the United States, the parent, guardian, or legal
representative of the student may sign a declaration so stating, under penalty of
perjury.”).
224
Id. § 31-13-27(a)(5) (“If no such documentation or declaration is presented,
the school official shall presume for the purposes of reporting under this section that
the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.”)
225
Id. § 31-13-27(e). The statute does, however, require that anyone intending to
disclose this information “shall first apply to the Attorney General and receive a
waiver of confidentiality from the requirements of this subsection.” Id.
226
See Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236, 1249–50 (11th
Cir. 2012).
227
Id. at 1246–47.
228
Id. at 1247.
229
Id.
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213

mation to those permitted under §§ 1644 and 1373, and found that the
federal anti-sanctuary provisions in fact “require[d] Alabama to provide
immigration-related information to the federal government and other
states upon request and prohibit[ed] Alabama from restricting this trans230
fer of information.” Concluding that the risks resulting from the mandatory disclosure of immigration status burdened the rights secured by
231
Plyler, the court found that § 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Neither party argued, nor did the court discuss, whether FERPA might
protect from disclosure the personal student information gathered by
schools pursuant to § 28. If it had, it is worth considering whether that
would have altered the court’s assessment of § 28.
First, whether or not the immigration-status information was protected from disclosure by FERPA, § 28 still arguably stands as an obstacle
to the free public education guaranteed by Plyler. One has to assume that
unauthorized immigrant children and their families in Alabama, even if
not specifically aware that §§ 1644 and 1373 permitted the sharing of
immigration status information between state, local and federal law enforcement agencies, could nonetheless be discouraged from enrolling in
public schools if in order to do so they had to reveal their immigration
status. This would be especially true given the media coverage of the en232
actment of H.B. 56 and the law’s stated purpose to “discourage illegal
immigration by requiring all agencies within this state to fully cooperate
with federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal im233
migration laws.”
Alternatively, if the Eleventh Circuit had considered whether the
student information gathered pursuant to § 28 was prohibited from disclosure by FERPA, it likely would have found that the information was in
fact protected. Information about a student’s place of birth and immigration status gathered in the course of enrollment and maintained by the
district would fall under FERPA’s definition of educational records. As
such, unless the information fell within one of the narrow exceptions defined in the FERPA statute, Alabama school officials could not disclose it
234
to federal immigration authorities without express parental consent.
230

Id. at 1248. (“Any textual prohibition on revealing the immigration status of
the children and their families is of little comfort when federal law requires that
disclosure upon request.”).
231
Id. at 1249–50.
232
See Richard Fausset, Alabama Enacts Anti-Illegal Immigration Law Described as
Nation’s Strictest, L.A. Times (June 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/
10/nation/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110610; Julia Preston, In Alabama, a Harsh
Bill for Residents Here Illegally, N.Y. Times (June 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/06/04/us/04immig.html.
233
Ala. Code § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis 2011).
234
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.8, 99.31 (2015).

LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete)

214

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

5/24/2016 4:23 PM

[Vol. 20:1

But even if the court had found that the immigration status information
collected by Alabama schools was protected by FERPA, it still seems likely
that it would have held that § 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The court noted the overall purpose of § 28 is to “target[] the population
of undocumented school children in Alabama,” and found that the
mandated disclosure of immigration status could lead not only to immigration enforcement and removal proceedings, but also to harassment
and intimidation that would deter unauthorized immigrant children
235
from enrolling in and attending school. The requirement to provide
immigration-status information, even without the possibility of disclosure
to federal immigration authorities, would lead to unacceptable burdens
236
on immigrant children and their families. Thus, even with the protections provided by FERPA, the demand for immigration-status information and documentation would likely still be found to unlawfully burden a child’s rights under Plyler.
The importance of acknowledging the privacy protections afforded
by FERPA is nonetheless significant since it serves as an important counterweight to the myth surrounding anti-sanctuary provisions that there
can be no restrictions on a school district’s ability to share immigration
status information with federal immigration authorities. As mentioned
above, this is an important message not just for immigrant children and
families seeking to enroll in public schools but also for school officials
and employees who may misunderstand their obligations under FERPA
in light of the anti-sanctuary provisions. The recent federal guidance on
237
this issue is an important first step but greater efforts should be made
by school districts to assure their students and their employees that, notwithstanding 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373 or state copycat anti-sanctuary
provisions, FERPA prohibits the disclosure of immigration-status information except in the narrowest of circumstances. Only then can the
promise of Plyler be fully achieved.

235

Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236, 1246–47
(11th Cir. 2012).
236
Id. (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2004)
(prohibiting questions pertaining to immigration status during discovery in order not
to “discourage legal and illegal immigrants alike from pursuing their potentially valid
legal claims not only in this case, but in future cases as well”) and Zeng Liu v. Donna
Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (finding that despite
employer’s promises not to disclose immigration status of plaintiffs sought through
discovery there would still remain ‘‘the danger of intimidation, the danger of
destroying the cause of action’’)).
237
See supra note 209.
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215

V. THE FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY PROVISIONS IN THE BATTLE
FOR AND AGAINST SUB-FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
A. The Path from Anti-Sanctuary to Pro-Enforcement
If Congress’s repeated failure to achieve fair and workable immigration reform has led certain states and localities to refuse to cooperate in
immigration enforcement, frustration with the federal government’s enforcement efforts has led others to take matters into their own hands and
to seek out ways to maximize their own contribution to these enforcement efforts. States and cities interested in taking on an active role in
immigration enforcement have become involved in a number of different ways, including entering into § 287(g) agreements to deputize local
238
officers to assist ICE enforcement and enacting legislation to discourage unauthorized immigrants from coming to or remaining in their ju239
risdictions. A number of states have also enacted legislation to override
and prevent the enactment of sanctuary laws and policies. That is, they
adopted measures like §§ 1644 and 1373 that prohibited restrictions on
240
communication of immigration-related information to ICE. Some of
238

Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was adopted as part of
IIRIRA in 1996. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)) “[§ 1357(g)] authorizes the Director of ICE to enter into
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, permitting designated
officers to perform immigration law enforcement functions, provided that the local
law enforcement officers receive appropriate training and function under the
supervision of ICE officers.” Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g. As of October 2012, fifty-seven 287(g)
agreements were in place. See The 287(g) Program: A Flawed and Obsolete Method of
Immigration Enforcement, Am. Immigr. Council (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/287g-program-flawed-and-obsolete-methodimmigration-enforcement.
239
This legislation included provisions restricting access to public benefits,
driver’s licenses, housing, educational programs, and health care, as well as provisions
creating state crimes for unlawful presence in the state and for transporting and
harboring unauthorized immigrants. See, e.g., Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer
and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 888; Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act, 2007 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 546–552; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18
(Sept. 2006); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2892 (2006). A number of these
state and local laws have been struck down following legal challenges. See, e.g., Lozano
v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010); Editorial, Alabama Surrenders, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/opinion/alabamasurrenders.html.
240
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (LexisNexis 2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 111051(F) (2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-23(b) (2012); Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-18.2-3
(LexisNexis 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-1 (West 2014); S.C. Code Ann. § 6-1-170
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these state anti-sanctuary provisions closely mirror and even specifically
241
reference §§ 1644 and 1373. Others provide some sort of penalty or
other enforcement mechanism not present in the federal anti-sanctuary
242
statutes. And some prohibit restrictions on a broader range of activities
than §§ 1644 and 1373, going beyond communicating, sending, receiving
and maintaining immigration-related information to prohibit policies
243
that limit cooperation with federal immigration officials.
State-level anti-sanctuary provisions have been put in place to invalidate existing measures and to ward off the implementation of future
sanctuary efforts. In California and Arizona, where there were longstanding sanctuary policies and practices in cities and towns within those
states, anti-sanctuary provisions have been introduced as part of broadly
sweeping legislation designed to bar unauthorized immigrant access to a
variety of services and benefits, including employment, health care, public benefits, and education, and to maximize state involvement in immigration enforcement. In California, Proposition 187 became law at a time
when there were sanctuary provisions in place in San Francisco, San Jose,
244
Oakland and Sacramento. In Arizona, the anti-sanctuary provisions in
S.B. 1070 were adopted after the cities of Tucson and Phoenix had im245
plemented sanctuary policies. In this respect, certain anti-sanctuary policies were indicative not only of the states’ frustration with federal immigration efforts but also with perceived obstacles to enforcement within
their own jurisdictions. As was true following the enactment of §§ 1644
and 1373, communities impacted by these sub-federal anti-sanctuary provisions reacted with concern about the chilling effect that these laws
would have on immigrant access to health care, education and other services, as well as the detrimental effect such policies would have on public
(2014); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-68-103 (2011); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1006
(LexisNexis 2012).
241
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (LexisNexis 2011) (specifically referencing
§§ 1344 and 1373); see also Mo. Ann. Stat. § 650.475(1), (3) (West 2014); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 74, § 20j(D)–(E) (West 2015); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1006 (LexisNexis
2012).
242
See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-23(c)–(d) (2012); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307(2)
(West 2014); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j(F) (West 2015); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 5-218.2-5 to -6; S.C. Code Ann. § 6-1-170(E)(3) (LexisNexis 2013).
243
See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-18.2-7 (LexisNexis 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 7111-1; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.63(B) (West Supp. 2014); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13170(C) (LexisNexis 2013).
244
See Carro, supra note 23, at 297 & n.2.
245
See Christian Palmer, Local Control at Issue in Battle over Enforcement of
Immigration Laws in Phoenix, Ariz. Capitol Times (Apr. 24, 2009), http://
azcapitoltimes.com/news/2009/04/24/local-control-at-issue-in-battle-over-enforcement-ofimmigration-laws/, 2009 WLNR 29878738 (quoting Arizona Senator Russell Pearce,

who stated that “Phoenix, Mesa, Chandler and Tucson, to name a few, all adequately
represent the ‘complete sanctuary city.’”).
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safety and health in general. These concerns led to legal challenges
where, once again, §§ 1644 and 1373 took center stage.
In 1994, two years before the federal anti-sanctuary provisions became law, California voters approved Proposition 187, a ballot initiative
that not only denied unauthorized immigrants access to public services
but also required public employees, including school teachers, health
care workers, and police officers to verify and report the immigration sta247
tus of anyone with which they came into contact. Notably for this discussion, Proposition 187 also contained an anti-sanctuary provision,
which specifically prohibited any local government or law enforcement
agency from limiting or restricting the ability of its officials to cooperate
248
with federal authorities on immigration. With its combination of provisions mandating cooperation and immigration-status reporting by public
employees and banning any restriction on such cooperation, Proposition
187 sent the clear message that unauthorized immigrants were unwelcome in the state and that, essentially, they had no place to hide from
249
immigration enforcement.
The day after the law went into effect, a number of legal challenges
250
were filed in state and federal court. Ultimately, the majority of the
challenged provisions of Proposition 187, including the anti-sanctuary

246

See Emily Bazar, Immigrant Activism Taking a Bold Turn, USA Today (Sept. 13,
2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-12-immigrants_N.htm; Darryl
Fears, Illegal Immigrants Targeted by States, Wash. Post (June 25, 2007), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/24/AR2007062401662.html.
247
See Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the
National Imagination, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 555, 555–56, 563 (1996).
248
In a section entitled “Law Enforcement Cooperation with INS,” Proposition
187 provided: “Any legislative, administrative, or other action by a city, county, or
other legally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries, or
by a law enforcement agency, to prevent or limit the cooperation required by
subdivision (a) is expressly prohibited.” Cal. Penal Code § 834b(c) (West 2008)
(repealed 2014).
249
Proponents of Proposition 187, also known as the Save Our State Initiative
(SOS), apparently envisioned that it would enable and encourage California residents
to participate in “rounding up” unauthorized immigrants in the state. See Patrick J.
McDonnell, Prop. 187 Turns Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate, L.A. Times, Aug. 10,
1994, at A1 (quoting Proposition 187 initiative co-founder saying to a crowd of
supporters, “you are the posse . . . SOS is the rope”); see also Prop. 187 § 1 (Cal. 1994)
(“[T]he People of California declare their intention to provide for cooperation
between their agencies of state and local government with the federal government,
and to establish a system of required notification by and between such agencies to
prevent illegal aliens in the United States from receiving benefits or public services in
the State of California.”).
250
Five actions filed in federal court were consolidated in League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Wilson (LULAC I), 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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provision, were found preempted by federal immigration law. With respect to § 4, which included the provisions mandating immigration inquiries and reporting, as well as the anti-sanctuary provision, the federal
district court, relying on De Canas v. Bica, found that these provisions
constituted an impermissible regulation of immigration and were
252
preempted. Distinguishing the Proposition 187 provisions from those
at issue in De Canas, the court found that they had much more than a
“purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration” and directly
regulated immigration by “creating a comprehensive scheme to detect
253
and report the presence and effect the removal of illegal aliens.” Additionally, the court found that, unlike the statute upheld in De Canas
which adopted federal standards to determine a person’s immigration
status, Proposition 187 created an entirely independent set of criteria of
immigration classifications and required state agents to make “independent determinations of who is subject to the initiative’s benefits denial, notification and cooperation/reporting provisions and who may lawfully
254
remain in the United States.” As a result, these provisions were an unconstitutional regulation of immigration and were preempted under De
255
Canas’s first test.
At the time of the district court’s ruling in League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Wilson, §§ 1644 and 1373 had not yet been enacted.
However, following the enactment of the anti-sanctuary provisions, the
State of California filed a motion for reconsideration and ultimately an
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the district court’s preemption
finding with respect to Proposition 187’s cooperation and reporting requirements, including the anti-sanctuary provision, and arguing that the
federal anti-sanctuary provisions “confirm that state and local government cooperation with the INS is not preempted as a regulation of im256
257
migration.” The district court denied the motion for reconsideration

251

Id. at 786–87.
Id. at 771 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
253
Id. at 769.
254
Id. at 769–70.
255
Id. at 771 (“[A] state may not require its agents to (i) make independent
determinations of who is and who is not in this country ‘in violation of immigration
laws;’ (ii) report such determinations to state and federal authorities; or (iii)
‘cooperate’ with the INS, solely for the purpose of ensuring that such persons leave
the country. The sole stated purpose and the sole effect of section 4 is to
impermissibly regulate immigration. Accordingly, section 4 is entirely preempted by
federal law under the first De Canas test.” (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354–56)).
256
Opening Brief of Appellants at 44, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wilson, No. 98-55671 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants], 1998
WL 34178728.
257
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 &
n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Defendants argued that the [Welfare Reform Act] permits
252
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and the appeal in the Ninth Circuit was ultimately withdrawn when the
parties reached a settlement that nullified the majority of Proposition
187, including the mandatory reporting and cooperation provisions and
258
the anti-sanctuary provision. Nevertheless, the reliance by both parties
on the federal anti-sanctuary provisions in the appeal reflect the increasingly divergent understanding of §§ 1644 and 1373 as, on one side, a
broad invitation for state and local involvement in immigration enforcement, and on the other, a limited authorization for immigration-related
information sharing.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, California contended that Congress’s unequivocal support for state and local cooperation in immigration enforcement, and its determination that such cooperation did not
constitute an “unwanted interference” with federal regulation of immigration, was reflected not only in §§ 1644 and 1373, but also in a separate
provision of the Welfare Reform Act that specifically required state agencies administering certain federal assistance programs to provide immigration-related information quarterly to federal immigration authori259
ties:
It is difficult to conceive of a plainer statement of congressional policy and intent that state and local government entities be permitted
to cooperate with the INS. [The Welfare Reform Act] and [IIRIRA]
thus reflect a congressional determination that state cooperation
with the INS is a permissible, indeed desirable, supplement to federal policy.260

The state further argued that, even though the federal anti-sanctuary
statutes permitted but did not require cooperation and reporting to the

cooperation between state and local government entities and the INS. The Court
agrees that some cooperation is permitted and even required by the [Act]. However,
the cooperation and reporting detailed in . . . Proposition 187 are part of a regulatory
scheme preempted by federal law, as explained in [LULAC I]. These sections of
Proposition 187 require state officials, teachers, health care providers and other
unknown individuals to report to the [INS] information about alien status that such
individuals are not permitted to determine. Nothing in [LULAC I] should be
interpreted to prohibit cooperation between state officials and the [INS] pursuant to
the [Welfare Reform Act].” (citations omitted)).
258
See Margaret Talev, Reaction Subdued on Prop. 187, L.A. Times (July 30, 1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/jul/30/local/me-60918.
259
See Brief of Appellants, supra note 256, at 45–47 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 611a
(2012)). Section 611a mandates that agencies that administer Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), housing-assistance programs, and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families “furnish information about aliens they know to be unlawfully in the United
States to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at least four times
annually and upon INS request.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 382 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
260
Brief of Appellants, supra note 256, at 47.
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extent that the state law did, there was no conflict since “compliance with
both state and federal law [was] possible” and the state laws were not an
261
obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal laws. Essentially here, the
state argued that because the state law provisions mirrored those in the
federal law, and even in some ways were more comprehensive than fed262
eral law, they survived conflict preemption.
The plaintiffs rejected the assertion that §§ 1644 and 1373 impacted
the court’s preemption analysis, arguing instead that they confirmed the
federal government’s determination to occupy the area of immigration
263
regulation. Had Congress intended to open up the area of immigration
law-making to states, they argued that Congress could have expressly
done so, and pointed to a provision of the Welfare Reform Act where
Congress had permitted states to enact such legislation in limited circum264
stances. Instead, plaintiffs argued that the immigration-related provisions of the Welfare Act and IIRIRA mandated immigration-status reporting in certain limited circumstances and “otherwise expressly permit[ed]
and explicitly protect[ed] the continued ability of local entities to choose
265
whether or not to report or cooperate.” Presaging arguments that
would be made by the United States more than a decade later in United
States v. Arizona, the plaintiffs also argued that the mandatory cooperation and reporting provisions of Proposition 187 were in conflict with the
voluntary reporting provided for in §§ 1644 and 1373:
There is, of course an important distinction—and conflict—
between a mandate and an authority or permission. Moreover, the
distinction would create havoc with the federal scheme and objectives . . . . [Proposition 187] would undermine enforcement of federal immigration laws by interposing a separate state program that
overwhelms the efforts of the federal agency.266

261

Id. at 53.
The argument that state immigration laws that “mirror” federal law are not
preempted has been widely used by proponents of state involvement in immigration
enforcement. For a comprehensive critique of the mirror-image theory, particularly
in the context of state criminal immigration law-making, see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc
L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law,
61 Duke L.J. 251, 278–79 (2011).
263
Opening Brief of Gregorio T. Plaintiffs–Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 67–68,
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. 98-55671 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellee], 1999 WL 33729894.
264
Id. at 67 (citing Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 411(d), 110 Stat. 2105, 2269 (requiring states that
intend to reject the federal restriction on access by unauthorized immigrants to statefunded public benefits to pass legislation specifically permitting such benefits)).
265
Id. at 67.
266
Id. at 84.
262
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While the anti-sanctuary provision in Proposition 187 did not survive,
it did not die in vain. In fact, it might properly be considered the mother
of all anti-sanctuary provisions. Indeed, it is likely that political pressure
brought to bear by the proponents of Proposition 187 ultimately led to
267
the passage of §§ 1644 and 1373. However, the apparent ineffectiveness
of §§ 1644 and 1373 at eliminating sanctuary laws and practices in the
years following their enactment led not only to efforts by Congress to
268
“put some teeth” in the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, but also to the
steady proliferation of state anti-sanctuary provisions, many of which, like
269
the proposals in Congress, included penalties for non-compliance.
Among the states that had enacted anti-sanctuary provisions by 2010
270
271
when Arizona’s S.B. 1070 became law were Colorado, Georgia, Mis267

Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1339, 1371 (2013)
(“It is easy to think of Proposition 187 as a quirk of California politics. Yet this
overlooks the extent to which Proposition 187 was entangled with the national
political conversation and national political actors. The chief architects and financial
supporters of Proposition 187 were the Federation for American Immigration Reform
(FAIR) and the Pioneer Fund—both major political organizations interested
foremost in national policy reform rather than immigration policies tailored to
specific states. The authors of Proposition 187 were prominent figures in federal
politics: Alan Nelson, who served as the Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) under President Reagan; and Harold Ezell, who was the
western regional commissioner for INS at the same time. It was also clear that the
authors of Proposition 187 were primarily interested in federal policies. Ezell argued
that ‘[t]here’s no need for another Proposition 187 in any other state if Congress
does its job.’” (footnotes omitted)); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in
an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. J. Int’l. L. 121, 125–26 (1994).
268
Tom Tancredo, Editorial, Should Congress Cut Money to States and Cities that Use
Tax Dollars to Aid Illegal Immigrants?, Duluth News-Trib. (May 6, 2006), 2006 WLNR
7763717 (discussing repeated efforts by the author, Colorado Representative Tom
Tancredo, to cut off all federal funding to localities with sanctuary laws in order to
“put some teeth into our anti-sanctuary laws”).
269
Of course, the subsequent proliferation of state anti-sanctuary and other proenforcement measures is indicative of the failure of the federal anti-sanctuary
provisions and IIRIRA in general as effective responses to unauthorized immigration.
Rather than driving the unauthorized immigrant population out of the United States,
IIRIRA provisions that made it more difficult for immigrants to move back and forth
between jobs in the United States and family south of the border had the opposite
effect. “Enhanced border controls and harsh penalties for unlawful entry to or
presence in the United States created a disincentive for unauthorized immigrants to
return home either because they wanted to avoid the perils and expense of another
unauthorized entry or because leaving could mean a lengthy separation from [U.S.
citizen] or permanent resident family members in the United States.” Elizabeth
McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing Off Steam or
Setting Wildfires?, 23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 293, 319 (2009) (footnote omitted).
270
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-29-103 (2012) (repealed 2013). Colorado’s law, enacted
while sanctuary provisions were in place in Denver, Boulder, and Durango, required
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275

souri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah. In Oklahoma, the antisanctuary provision prohibited any restrictions on cooperation as well as
communication with federal immigration authorities, and provided for a
right of action by any state resident to force compliance with the stat276
ute. In Missouri and Ohio, non-compliant government entities would
277
be denied state funding. A number of other states tried unsuccessfully
to pass anti-sanctuary laws in the years leading up to Arizona’s adoption
278
279
of S.B.1070. The outcome of United States v. Arizona would clarify the
limits of state and local authority to cooperate and assist with federal immigration law enforcement.
B. United States v. Arizona: The Evolving Meaning of §§ 1644 and 1373
The competing characterizations of §§ 1644 and 1373—on the one
hand, as expressions of Congress’s clear intent to maximize cooperation
between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in enforcing
federal immigration laws and, on the other hand, as explicit limits on the
nature of non-federal engagement in immigration enforcement—came
280
head to head in United States v. Arizona. In this challenge to the Arizona
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070),
the United States sought to enjoin a number of provisions of a nowinfamous state law that was widely regarded as a model for states seeking
281
to maximize their engagement in immigration enforcement. Two of
the challenged provisions, §§ 3 and 5(c), created new state crimes and
police to contact ICE whenever a person suspected of being an unauthorized
immigrant was arrested on a misdemeanor or felony charge. See Anti-Sanctuary Law
Sets Off Consular Tiff, Wash. Times (May 7, 2006), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2006/may/7/20060507-121634-7756r/print/.
271
Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-23 (2012).
272
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 650.475 (West 2014).
273
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j (West 2015).
274
Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-68-103 (2011).
275
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1006 (LexisNexis 2012)(declared preempted in part
by Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1143 (D. Utah 2014)).
276
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 20j(F) (West 2015).
277
See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 650.475(5) (West 2014); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.63(C)
(West Supp. 2014).
278
See Anna Gorman, Arizona’s Immigration Law Isn’t the Only One, L.A. Times (July
16, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/16/nation/la-na-immigration-states20100717.
279
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012).
280
See id. at 350–51.
281
See id. at 343–44; Seth Freed Wessler, Bills Modeled After Arizona’s SB 1070
Spread Through States, Race Forward: Colorlines, (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.
colorlines.com/content/bills-modeled-after-arizonas-sb-1070-spread-through-states
(listing 16 states considering bills modeled after S.B. 1070).
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criminal penalties for failing to comply with federal alien-registration re282
quirements and working without authorization. Section 2(E) authorized warrantless arrests by Arizona officers when there is probable cause
to believe that a person has committed a “public offense that makes the
283
person removable from the United States.” Section 2(B), the so-called
“show me your papers” provision, required police officers to verify the
immigration status of anyone stopped or detained for any reason where
the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the person is unlawfully
284
present in the United States. The Supreme Court found that three out
of four provisions challenged by the United States and previously enjoined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, were preempted by federal
285
286
law. Section 2(B) survived a facial challenge. The federal antisanctuary provisions played a significant role in the arguments on both
sides of the case, and in particular with respect to the challenge to
§ 2(B).
As a starting point, it is worth noting that, in addition to § 2(B)’s
mandatory immigration status checks, § 2 of S.B. 1070 also contained its
own anti-sanctuary provisions, that read, in part:
A. No official or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other
political subdivision of this state may limit or restrict the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law.
....
F. Except as provided in federal law, officials or agencies of this
state and counties, cities, towns and other political subdivisions of
this state may not be prohibited or in any way be restricted from
sending, receiving or maintaining information relating to the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual or exchanging that information with any other federal, state or local governmental entity for the following official purposes:
1. Determining eligibility for any public benefit, service or license
provided by any federal, state, local or other political subdivision of
this state.
2. Verifying any claim of residence or domicile if determination of
residence or domicile is required under the laws of this state or a
judicial order issued pursuant to a civil or criminal proceeding in
this state.
282
283
284
285
286

S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 3, 5(c) (Ariz. 2010).
Id. § 2(E).
Id. § 2(B).
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–07 (2012).
Id. at 2510.
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3. If the person is an alien, determining whether the person is in
compliance with the federal registration laws prescribed by title II,
chapter 7 of the federal immigration and nationality act.
4. Pursuant to 8 United States Code § 1373 and 8 United States
Code § 1644.
....
H. A person who is a legal resident of this state may bring an action
in superior court to challenge any official or agency of this state or
a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state that
adopts or implements a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws, including 8 United States Code
§§ 1373 and 1644, to less than the full extent permitted by federal
law. If there is a judicial finding that an entity has violated this section, the court shall order that the entity pay a civil penalty of not
less than five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars for each day that the policy has remained in effect after the filing of an action pursuant to this subsection.
....
K. Except in relation to matters in which the officer is adjudged to
have acted in bad faith, a law enforcement officer is indemnified by
the law enforcement officer’s agency against reasonable costs and
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by the officer in connection with any action, suit or proceeding brought pursuant to this
section in which the officer may be a defendant by reason of the officer being or having been a member of the law enforcement agency.287

Like many other jurisdictions, Arizona had adopted its anti-sanctuary
provision as part of a more comprehensive effort to engage state agencies
and officers in immigration enforcement at a time of growing frustration
with federal immigration-enforcement efforts, including frustration with
the administration’s failure to stop the proliferation of sanctuary cities in
288
violation of §§ 1644 and 1373. Arizona’s anti-sanctuary provision went
further than §§ 1644 and 1373 by providing an enforcement mechanism
that allowed residents of the state to bring a civil action against any non287

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 (2012)
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Landmark Legal Foundation in Support of
Petitioners at 18, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (“[The United
States’s] decision to prevent Arizona from protecting its citizens is even more galling
in light of its willful failure to stop more egregious actions by state and local
governments around the country that are in violation of and contrary to federal law.
Certain states and local governments have decided to flout federal law and declare
themselves ‘sanctuary cities’ where immigration status is concealed from federal
authorities. Many have also decided to provide in-state tuition benefits to illegal
aliens, in direct contravention of federal law.”).
288
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complying jurisdiction. It also provided that government entities found
to have enacted or implemented a policy or practice restricting the enforcement of federal immigration laws, including §§ 1644 and 1377, are
289
subject to hefty financial penalties. Additionally, the anti-sanctuary provision leaves open the possibility that individual police officers could be
made to bear the costs of a legal challenge if they are found to have acted
in bad faith, arguably incentivizing officers to over-comply with the mandated immigration cooperation and reporting in order to avoid being
290
found in violation. Arizona’s anti-sanctuary provision was not among
the four challenged provisions of S.B. 1070 considered by the Supreme
291
Court. However, like the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, they were integral to the arguments in United States v. Arizona for and against S.B. 1070.
The United States argued that § 2(B) of S.B. 1070 was preempted by
292
8 U.S.C. § 1373. Section 2(B)’s mandatory status-check, according to
the United States, was preempted because it stood as an obstacle to the
federal–state cooperation § 1373 envisioned by forcing officers to make
status inquiries irrespective of whether such inquiries were in line with
293
the government’s immigration-enforcement priorities.
The United
States contended that § 2(B)’s mandatory status checks, together with the
civil penalties imposed in § 2(H) for failing to comply with this mandate,
stood in conflict with federal law and threatened to divert federal resources from the federal government’s immigration enforcement priori294
ties. Rather than facilitating cooperation and information sharing, as
§ 1373 envisioned, S.B. 1070 “harnesses the federal apparatus in pursuit
289

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(H).
See Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policy Making, 79 UMKC L.
Rev. 901, 914 (2011).
291
Potential challenges to subsections 2(A), (C)–(G), and (I)–(L) were dismissed
by the district court. See Order at 12–13, United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. Dec. 10, 2010).
292
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2508; Brief for the United States, supra
note 17, at 50–52.
293
Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 48 (“DHS’s highest enforcement
priorities are aliens who threaten public safety or national security and members of
criminal gangs that smuggle aliens and contraband. DHS also gives priority to
removing repeat border crossers, recent entrants, aliens who have previously been
removed, and aliens who have disregarded a final order of removal.”); see also
Complaint at 17, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No.
2:10-cv-01413-NVW) (“The mandatory nature of Section 2, in tandem with S.B. 1070’s
new or amended state immigration crimes, directs officers to seek maximum scrutiny
of a person’s immigration status, and mandates the imposition of state criminal
penalties for what is effectively unlawful presence, even in circumstances where the
federal government has decided not to impose such penalties because of federal
enforcement priorities or humanitarian, foreign policy, or other federal interests.”).
294
Complaint, supra note 293, at 16–18.
290
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of a scheme over which the federal government would have no control,
and would proceed without regard to federal practice and policy and the
295
essential nature of the cooperative relationship.” According to the
United States, §§ 1644 and 1373 were intended to facilitate mutual information sharing, including by preempting state and local sanctuary
296
measures, such as the one at issue in City of New York v. United States,
297
which restricted immigration-related information sharing. The federal
anti-sanctuary provisions did this by ensuring that there would be no restrictions on information sharing by state and local governments and, in
§ 1373(c), mandating that ICE reply to those requests for information.
But, the United States argued that § 1373 “does not sanction efforts to
use DHS resources to enforce the federal immigration laws without re298
gard to federal priorities and discretion.” The conflict between § 2(B)
and the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, the United States argued,
stemmed essentially from the mandatory nature of the reporting required by § 2(B), a mandate not present in §§ 1373 and 1644, which require nothing on the part of state and local governments but merely ensure that they not be restricted in their ability to communicate with
299
federal immigration authorities. That mandate in § 2(B) eliminates the
discretion necessary for state and local actors to cooperate with and otherwise act in conformity with federal immigration priorities.
Arizona’s arguments in support of S.B. 1070, and § 2(B) in particular, centered largely on an assertion that Congress had enacted numerous laws and policies, including §§ 1644 and 1373, that reflected a broad
intent to encourage state and local cooperation in immigration enforce300
ment, and that S.B. 1070 was completely consistent with those policies.
Arizona identified sanctuary laws and policies enacted by state and local
governments as one of two primary sets of obstacles to the enforcement
of federal immigration laws, to which the Federal Government had responded in 1996 by “establish[ing] a federal policy of encouraging cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities in enforcing the federal immigration laws,” and implementing that policy through §§ 1644
301
and 1373. Thus, according to Arizona, §§ 1644 and 1373 were more
302
than anti-sanctuary provisions. They were pro-enforcement provisions.
295

Brief for Appellee at 50, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011)
(No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162512.
296
City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1999).
297
Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 51–52.
298
Id. at 52.
299
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
300
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 16, at 12–13.
301
Id. at 7–9.
302
Id. at 27 (“Congress has expressed a clear intent to encourage the assistance
from state and local law enforcement officers in the enforcement of federal

LCB_20_1_Art_4_McCormick (Do Not Delete)

2016]

FEDERAL ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW

5/24/2016 4:23 PM

227

Pointing to §§ 1644 and 1373, Arizona asserted that “Congress expressly contemplated that state and local law enforcement officers and
agencies would inquire into the immigration status of lawfully-present aliens, and Congress determined—mandated—that ICE respond because
Congress concluded that this sharing of information was of critical im303
portance in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.” Indeed, according to Arizona, §§ 1644 and 1373 not only mandate that ICE respond
to inquiries from state and local law enforcement, they also mandate that
304
state and local officers make such inquiries. In this respect, Arizona
contended that § 2(B) of S.B. 1070, by mandating immigration-status inquiries, simply mirrored the federal anti-sanctuary provisions, and so
questioned the viability of the United States’s conflict preemption argu305
ment. And in response to the Ninth Circuit’s more limited characterization of §§ 1373 and 1644 as “anti-sanctuary provisions” that prohibit
states from impeding immigration enforcement but are not an “invita306
tion” to states to enact immigration legislation, Arizona argued instead
that “these provisions expressly confirm that nothing in federal law stands
307
in the way of state statutes such as § 2(B).”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding
308
that § 2(B) was preempted. The Court found that the mandatory nature of § 2(B)’s immigration status checks did not interfere or conflict
with federal law, even if those status checks took place under circumstances that would fall outside the federal government’s immigration en309
forcement priorities. While the Court expressed support for the federal
government’s discretionary authority in implementing federal immigraimmigration laws that section 2(B) would provide.”).
303
Id.
304
See Brief for Petitioners at 24–25, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No.
11-182), 2012 WL 416748, at *8 (“The federal immigration laws not only decline to
preempt state law enforcement efforts, they affirmatively require federal
cooperation.”).
305
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 299, at 21–22 (“It does do one thing
that’s very important, though, which it does have the effect of overriding local
policies that actually forbad some officers from making those communications . . .
because that’s one of the primary effects of 2(B). It just shows how difficult the
government’s preemption argument is here because those kind of local policies are
expressly forbidden by Federal statute. [Sections 1373(a) and 1644] basically say that
localities can’t have those kind of sanctuary laws. And so one effect that 2(B) has is,
on a state level, it basically says, look, you can’t have local officers telling you not to
make those inquiries. You must have those inquiries.”).
306
See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 351 n.11 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d in
part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
307
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 304, at 37.
308
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
309
Id. at 2508.
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310

tion law, the Court found nothing in federal law which required state
or local law enforcement officers to consider federal enforcement priorities in deciding whether to contact ICE to obtain status information
311
about a person who has been lawfully detained. Additionally, the Court
seemed unpersuaded that § 2(B) would inevitably lead to a conflict with
federal enforcement priorities since, even if Arizona law enforcement
contacted ICE about a detained person, ICE ultimately retained the authority to decide how and whether to enforce federal immigration laws in
312
each case. Concluding that the federal statutory scheme, including
§§ 1644 and 1373, encouraged the sharing of information about possible
immigration violations, the Court determined that it “leaves room for a
313
policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.” Notably, the Court interpreted § 2(B) to permit status inquiries and information sharing with ICE only in the context of an otherwise constitutional stop or arrest. While acknowledging that § 2(B) might be applied in a
way that would raise constitutional concerns, the Court concluded that
§ 2(B) survived a facial challenge absent “some showing that enforcement of the provision in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and
314
its objectives.”
In the end, neither side succeeded in getting the Court to adopt its
interpretation of the federal anti-sanctuary statutes. The Court rejected
the United States’s narrow interpretation of permissible state–federal
immigration cooperation and its argument that “by refusing to respect
Congress’s designation of the Executive Branch to take the lead in the

310

See id. at 2499 (“A principal feature of the removal system is the broad
discretion exercised by immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial matter,
must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings
commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to
remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal.” (citation
omitted)).
311
Id. at 2508.
312
During oral argument, several Justices questioned the Solicitor General about
the actual impact of calls to ICE in circumstances where the detained individual
might not be an enforcement priority, and suggested that ICE still maintained
authority over the ultimate decision regarding enforcement. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 299, at 71 (“All it does is lets you know . . . that an illegal alien
has been arrested, and you can decide, we are not going to initiate removal
proceedings against that individual. It doesn’t require you to remove one more
person than you would like to remove under your priorities.”); id. at 56 (“[I]t’s not
that it’s forcing you to change your enforcement priorities. You don’t have to take the
person into custody.”).
313
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (citing Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985–86 (2011) (finding no preemption of Arizona law
requiring that employers verify the immigration status of employees using a federal
system that had been promoted by the United States)).
314
Id. at 2510.
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enforcement of the federal immigration laws, and by requiring all Arizona officers to adhere instead to the State’s own policy of ‘attrition
through enforcement,’ Arizona exceeded the permissible bounds of cooperation” between states and the federal government provided for in
315
federal immigration law.
On the other hand, the Court also rejected the expanded interpretation of permissible state–federal cooperation proffered by Arizona in its
defense of S.B. 1070 § 6, which authorized warrantless arrests for immigration violations: “There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes
cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the
term would incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest
an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or other in316
struction from the Federal Government.”
VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AN ANTI-SANCTUARY
APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
In the almost 20 years since the adoption of the federal antisanctuary provisions, some clarity about the meaning and the purpose of
the statutes has emerged. First, despite all arguments to the contrary, the
federal anti-sanctuary statutes do not mandate that states and localities
317
do anything. The argument that the statutes mandate state action,
whether that is in the form of information sharing, information gathering, or general cooperation around immigration enforcement, has been
repeatedly rejected, whether argued by those wanting to invalidate anti318
319
sanctuary laws or by those seeking to invalidate sanctuary provisions.
Indeed, Congress expressed its intent not to mandate but simply to authorize communication with federal immigration authorities from the
320
very beginning.
A second point of clarity, related to the first, is that the anti-sanctuary
statutes prohibit restrictions on communication; they do not prohibit re321
strictions on other activities by state and local agencies and officers.
Therefore, a state or municipal government can prohibit its employees or
officers from inquiring about immigration status where it is not otherwise
required by law or from initiating contact with individuals for the pur-

315
316
317
318
319
320
321

Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 43.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
See, e.g., City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
See id.
See Doe v. City of New York, 860 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 731 (Ct. App. 2009).
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322

pose of discovering their immigration statuses. On the other hand,
states and municipalities may not, consistent with §§ 1644 and 1373,
place restrictions on immigration-related information sharing with the
federal immigration authorities, unless that restriction is part of a broad323
er policy to protect confidential information from disclosure.
Third, the anti-sanctuary statutes do not provide for a private right of
action for individuals claiming harm in connection with them, whether
324
that claim is for damages or to compel compliance with the statutes.
Indeed, allegations that the anti-sanctuary statutes have been both unenforceable and unenforced have led members of Congress to attempt to
amend the statutes numerous times in recent years to include enforce325
ment provisions and penalties. These efforts have so far all failed but
have included proposals to deny funding to jurisdictions that fail to comply with §§ 1373 and 1644, and creating civil or criminal liability for fail326
ures to comply.
Fourth, the federal anti-sanctuary measures do not repeal or otherwise override the privacy protections in other federal statutes, including
FERPA and HIPAA. Most importantly, they do not provide a blank check
for the voluntary sharing of information that is otherwise protected from
disclosure under federal law. Moreover, the unauthorized release of otherwise protected records to federal immigration officers pursuant to the
permission granted under §§ 1644 and 1373 may be punishable with civil
327
and criminal penalties.
Finally, states and municipalities may mandate certain types of cooperation with federal immigration enforcement without conflict with the
328
anti-sanctuary statutes. In particular, state statutes that mandate immigration status checks and reporting are not preempted per se by the federal anti-sanctuary statutes or the federal government’s exclusive power
329
over immigration. However, mandatory status checks, reporting or oth-

322

Id.
City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
324
See Lewis v. City of Kimball, No. 4:06CV3084, 2006 WL 2375479, at *6 (D. Neb.
Aug. 14, 2006); Bologna v. City and County of San Francisco, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406,
414–15 (Ct. App. 2011); Doe, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 844–45.
325
See, e.g., Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 3009, 114th Cong.
(2015); Subcomm. on Investig. of the Comm. On Governmental Affairs,
Criminal Aliens in the United States, S. Rep. No. 104-48, 30 (1995).
326
Id. n.75.
327
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2012) (HIPAA penalties); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723–
2724 (2012) (Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 penalties).
328
Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 581–82 (Ct. App. 2008).
329
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508–10 (2012); Sturgeon v. Bratton,
95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 731–33 (Ct. App. 2009).
323
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er cooperation that in practice conflicts or interferes with the federal
330
government’s immigration enforcement authority are preempted.
In the wake of the tragic killing of Kate Steinle, with overwhelming
attention and criticism focused on San Francisco’s sanctuary law, the lessons learned about the anti-sanctuary provisions over two decades may
help guide the conversation going forward. A torrent of blame for Kate
Steinle’s death has been unleashed against various city officials and agencies for implementing San Francisco’s sanctuary ordinances, allegedly in
violation of the federal anti-sanctuary statutes, and against the Obama
administration for a failure to enforce the anti-sanctuary provisions
331
against San Francisco and against sanctuary cities in general. The familiar complaint of supporters of tougher immigration enforcement—that if
the laws on the books were just enforced, the problem of unauthorized
332
immigration would be solved—runs through these arguments. In other
words, if the federal anti-sanctuary provisions had been enforced, LopezSanchez would not have been released and Kate Steinle would not be
dead. Unfortunately, these criticisms fail to acknowledge at least two critical points. First, by all accounts, the decision to release Lopez-Sanchez
was not premised on San Francisco’s City of Refuge ordinance, but instead was based on the 2013 city ordinance prescribing the circumstances
333
in which a federal immigration detainer could be honored. While there
is disagreement about whether the sheriff’s office misinterpreted the de-

330

United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 351–52 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part,
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
331
Valerie Richardson, Kathryn Steinle Killing Fuels Outrage over Democrats’
Deportation Opposition, Wash. Times (July 6, 2015) http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2015/jul/6/kathryn-steinle-killing-fuels-outrage-over-democra/?page=all
(reporting statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte that the administration was “releasing
criminals back onto the streets” and was “not enforcing our immigration laws . . .
[a]nd, quite frankly, I don’t think they care”).
332
See, e.g., Jessica M. Vaughan, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective
Strategy to Shrink the Illegal Population, Ctr. for Immigr. Stud.: Backgrounder (Apr.
2006), http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2006/back406.pdf; Attrition Through
Enforcement Is the True Middle-Ground Solution, NumbersUSA (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/american-workers/attritionthrough-enforcement-true-middl.html (“[L]iving illegally in the United States will
become more difficult and less satisfying over time when the government—at ALL
LEVELS—enforces all of the laws already on the books.”). But see The Fallacy of
“Enforcement First,” Am. Immigr. Council (May 9, 2013), http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/fallacy-enforcement-first (describing the futility of
enforcing unworkable laws that themselves promote unauthorized immigration).
333
See Press Release, Office of the Sheriff, City & Cty. of S.F., Sheriff Ross
Mirkarimi Sets the Record Straight on the April 2015 Release of Juan Francisco
Lopez-Sanchez and Offers Recommendations for the Future (July 10, 2015), http://
www.sfsheriff.com/files/SFSD_PR_RM_07_10_15.pdf.
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tainer ordinance in deciding to release Lopez-Sanchez, the detainer
ordinance itself does not conflict with federal law. The 1996 antisanctuary statutes do not mandate in any way that any jurisdiction honor
a detainer request from ICE, such as the one provided to San Francisco
before the release of Francisco Lopez-Sanchez. Indeed, not only is compliance with such requests not mandated by the federal anti-sanctuary
provisions, it is also not mandated by the federal regulations authorizing
335
ICE to issue detainers. Secondly, San Francisco’s City of Refuge Ordinance would not have prohibited the Sheriff from contacting ICE about
Lopez-Sanchez, because it permits cooperation and communication with
336
ICE in cases involving individuals with prior felony convictions. Even
without holding Lopez-Sanchez on the ICE detainer, the Sheriff would
have been free to notify ICE that his San Francisco criminal matter was
dismissed and that he would soon be released so that ICE could make ar337
rangements to take him into custody. Thus, even had the Obama administration enforced the anti-sanctuary provisions against San Francisco,
it is far from clear that this would have prevented the release of LopezSanchez or the killing of Kate Steinle.
Nevertheless, the political reaction to the killing has been swift.
Within weeks of Steinle’s death, several proposals were introduced in
Congress that would prohibit federal funding to states and cities that
338
have sanctuary policies in place. There were also proposals to mandate
334

See Vivian Ho, S.F. Deputies Union Ties Pier Killing to Sheriff’s Order, S.F. Chron.
(July 17, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/S-F-deputies-union-tiespier-killing-to-6389935.php (discussing complaint against sheriff by deputy-sheriffs’
union alleging that a memo issued by the Sheriff in connection with the detainer
ordinance improperly prohibited staff from giving information about detainees to
immigration agents).
335
See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 2015) (requiring
probable cause for an ICE agent to issue an immigration detainer); Galarza v.
Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that immigration detainers under
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 are voluntary requests to state and local law enforcement to detain a
person for no more than an additional 48 hours). The Third Circuit cited various
local laws limiting cooperation on immigration detainers, including in Santa Clara
County, California, New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco, as evidence that
immigration detainers cannot be mandatory. Id. at 645 & n.10.
336
See S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 12H.2-1 (2015); Ho, supra note 334 (reporting
statement of Mayor Ed Lee that “nothing in this sanctuary-city law prohibits the
officials of the city and county of San Francisco to communicate, to engage in
discussion”).
337
ICE officials contend that they could have easily made arrangements to take
Lopez-Sanchez into custody immediately upon his arrest if they had notified, though
ICE’s reliability in that regard is disputed. See Eric Kurhi & Matthew Artz, As S.F.
Shooting Suspect Apologizes, Factions Square Off over Noncompliance Policy, San Jose
Mercury News (July 7, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_
28442952/s-f-shooting-suspect-apologizes-actions-square-off.
338
S. 1640, 114th Cong. § 114 (2015); H.R. 1148, 114th Cong. § 114 (2015); see
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reporting of immigration-status related information every time anyone
339
suspected of being an unauthorized immigrant is taken into custody.
Another bill, Kate’s Law, championed by Fox News commentator Bill
O’Reilly, imposes a mandatory five-year prison term following a convic340
tion for illegal reentry after a deportation. Similar measures have been
341
introduced before and failed, and though there is momentum to take
action in response to Kate Steinle’s death, there are reasons to proceed
with caution. First, an unfunded mandate to states and cities to report information about suspected unauthorized immigrants to ICE, as at least
one of the current proposals includes, would not survive a Tenth
342
Amendment challenge. Alternatively, cutting off federal funding to
states and cities that are resistant to engaging in immigration enforcement, while it may survive a constitutional challenge, is likely to test already strained relationships between ICE and state and local govern343
ments and law enforcement agencies. Forcing states and cities to
engage under threat of critical funding loss may result in more participation by states and cities but it ignores their legitimate concerns about the
detrimental impact on community policing and public health and safety.
Similarly, imposing mandatory sentences for unlawful reentry seems also
to miss the mark since this would likely divert already scarce resources to
the prosecution and incarceration of individuals, most of whom are not
likely to be serious criminals or otherwise pose a danger to the communi-

also San Francisco Shooting Prompts Debate Over ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ CQ News (July 13,
2015), 2015 WLNR 21363609 (discussing introduction of several bills targeting
sanctuary cities).
339
S. 1640 § 111(2); H.R. 1148 § 111(2).
340
See Erik Wemple, Fox News’s Bill O’Reilly Embraces Activism with ‘Kate’s Law,’
Wash. Post (July 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/
wp/2015/07/14/c/.
341
S. 169, 112th Cong. (2011) (restricting funding to sanctuary cities); see also
H.R. 2217, 113th Cong. § 577 (as reported by S. Comm. on Appropriations, July 18,
2013) (removing a provision that would have denied funds for use in contravention
of §§ 1644 and 1373); Andrew Adams, Congressman Wants to Penalize Salt Lake City over
Immigration Enforcement, Deseret News (May 11, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.
com/article/705372473/Congressman-wants-to-penalize-Salt-Lake-City-over-immigrationenforcement.html (discussing bill introduced by representative Lou Barletta to

withhold federal funding to sanctuary cities).
342
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program.”)
343
See Homeland Security Hearing, supra note 9, at 9 (statement of Jeh Johnson,
U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Security) (stating that one challenge to immigration
enforcement is “fixing our relationship with State and local law enforcement”).
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344

ty. Federal law already provides for criminal fines and imprisonment up
345
to 20 years for unlawful reentry after removal. Given the fact that
Lopez-Sanchez had been prosecuted and imprisoned three times for unlawful reentry after a removal, in one case serving more than four years in
prison, he was apparently not deterred from returning to the United
346
States by the threat of incarceration.
Perhaps the biggest lesson learned 20 years after the passage of
§§ 1644 and 1373 is that an anti-sanctuary approach to unauthorized
immigration does not lead to real solutions. The anti-sanctuary statutes, if
they have been effective at all, have been effective as weapons of political
rhetoric, designed to send a message that unauthorized immigrants have
no place to hide and to, as much as constitutionally permissible, enlist
states and municipalities in joining in delivering that message. Sanctuary,
like amnesty, has become a term so wrought with controversy and derision, that public officials, lawmakers, and especially political candidates,
deny any association with it. This is no wonder since, in the context of the
national debate on immigration, sanctuary has become synonymous with
“pro illegal immigration.” Jurisdictions that have adopted laws or policies
that restrict involvement in immigration enforcement or otherwise allow
law-abiding unauthorized immigrants to live in a community without fear
are accused of protecting lawbreakers and even being lawbreakers themselves. From the perspective of critics of sanctuary policies, anything short
of full enforcement of the immigration laws is properly labeled as sanctuary, including most recently the Obama administration’s efforts to prioritize enforcement resources through the exercise of prosecutorial discre347
tion.
The federal anti-sanctuary laws, by encouraging state and local governments to assist with immigration enforcement by enlisting personnel
from local law enforcement, schools, hospitals, and other public agencies, have become an integral piece of immigration restrictionists’ attri348
tion-through-enforcement strategy. This is a strategy designed to drive
344

See Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes,
Records Show, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/
more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html.
345
See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012).
346
See Romney et al., supra note 1.
347
See Homeland Security Hearing, supra note 9, at 2–3 (statement of Bob
Goodlatte, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary); Foley, supra note 22.
348
A key component of this strategy is enlisting cooperation and assistance from
states and localities in immigration enforcement in order to “discourage the
settlement of illegal aliens and to make it more difficult for illegal aliens to conceal
their status.” See Michele Waslin, Immigration Policy Ctr., Discrediting “Self
Deportation” as Immigration Policy 4 (Feb. 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.
org/sites/default/files/docs/Waslin_-_Attrition_Through_Enforcement_020612.pdf
(quoting Vaughan, supra note 332, at 3).
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unauthorized immigrants out of the United States through a combination of increased local enforcement efforts and laws that make it difficult
to find work or a place to live or to access public services. But as states
and cities have grown more concerned about the loss of trust between
law enforcement agencies and immigrant residents and the harm to public health and safety, they have also become more resistant to efforts to
engage them in increasingly more aggressive federal enforcement pro349
grams. Recently, federal immigration authorities have begun to respond to this resistance, recognizing that a stronger and stronger push
for state and local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts, without regard for the legitimate concerns of states and cities to
protect public health and safety and promote the general welfare of their
350
communities, has been a failure as an enforcement strategy.
The rush to take action following the death of Kate Steinle is understandable, but targeting sanctuary laws and policies will not solve the
problem of unauthorized immigration any more than it would have prevented the release of Lopez-Sanchez. That problem will not be solved
without thoughtful, meaningful reforms that focus limited enforcement
resources on serious threats to public safety and national security, while
providing some solution for the millions of unauthorized immigrants living in our communities who pose no threat. Anti-sanctuary policies alone
were not the answer in 1996 and they are not the answer now.

349

See Lynn Tramonte, Immigration Policy Ctr., Debunking the Myth of
“Sanctuary Cities” 8 (April 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/Community_Policing_Policies_Protect_American_042611_update.
pdf (“287(g) and Secure Communities are two federal programs that involve state
and local police in the deportation of immigrants. Although described as targeting
foreign-born criminals, these programs—as well as the erroneous belief that state and
local police have the ‘inherent authority’ to enforce civil immigration laws—are also
sweeping up immigrants who have not committed crimes, and harming the
relationship between police and the immigrant community.” (footnotes omitted)).
350
See Statement from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Director Sarah
R. Saldaña, U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enforcement (Mar. 20, 2015), https://
www.ice.gov/news/releases/statement-us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-icedirector-saldana (“The reality is that Secure Communities had become legally and
politically controversial, and led to the enactment by numerous jurisdictions of laws,
ordinances, directives and policies that limit their cooperation with ICE in our efforts
to promote public safety. . . . The overriding objective is public safety, while
implementing this new approach in a way that upholds the trusted relationships local
law enforcement need to build with and among their communities, and we believe
these officials will recognize and concur with our goals. Any effort at federal
legislation now to mandate state and local law enforcement’s compliance with ICE
detainers will, in our view, be a highly counterproductive step and lead to more
resistance and less cooperation in our overall efforts to promote public safety.”).

